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Chapter One: The Left-Right Political Dichotomy
The Left-Right (LR) dichotomy is a form of political identification that has long been
utilized as the foundational framework for nearly all analyses relating to voter, party, and national
political associations. Since its inception after the French Revolution, this labeling mechanism has
operated on both systemic and individual levels.1 As it relates to the former, the Left-Right divide
forms a code of communication between politicians, mass media and voters; in terms of the
individual, the split is an instrument to help voters understand the political realm.2 This label serves
to orient citizens and guide them through a mix of political messages, help them identify players and
parts, and shape their electoral choices.3 The simplification enabled by the Left-Right divide has a
cognitive usefulness in that it reduces the complexity found in democratic systems to a basic and
more manageable descriptive alternative.4
Even though this labeling has provided political scientists with an analytical model that can
be applied to multiple countries and peoples across time and space, there is a lack of flexibility when
it comes using these terms in academia on a more contextual level. This means that although the
Left-Right dimension is both globally recognized and utilized, it often does not accurately represent
the political realities of countries where ideological alignments are fluid and unconcerned with LR
distinctions. Drawing upon historical evaluations of this associative mechanism, this chapter
explores the various manifestations, meanings, and changes of the LR dichotomy, and its
inapplicability in explaining populism.

Andre Freire and Kats Kivistik,, “Western and non-Western meanings of the Left–Right divide across four
continents,” Journal of Political Ideologies, (June 2013). 10.1080/13569317.2013.784009
2 Ibid.
3 Guillermo Rico and M. Kent Jennings, “The Formation of Left-Right Identification: Pathways and Correlates of
Parental Influence,” Political Psychology, (February 16, 2015). https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12243
4 Ana Rita Ferreira and Joao Cardoso Rosas, Left and Right: The Great Dichotomy Revisited, Cambridge Scholars Publishing
(November 1, 2013).
1
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Political positions and preferences are frequently expressed in left/right terms.5 This can be
seen in the realm of politics, mass media, and casual everyday interactions. However, the
normalization of this descriptive device should not be mistaken for innateness. Even though it
seems consistent throughout history, the Left-Right divide has undergone various changes since its
founding. The origins of the LR distinction can be traced back to the political positions held by the
various constituencies of the National Constituent Assembly in Paris in July 1789; those that were
sitting to the right of the presidency represented the interests of the aristocracy and parts of the
clergy concerned with upholding their status quo.6 Those sitting to the left included republicans,
liberal, democrats, and monarchists that to various degrees, advocated a profound change of
regime.7 Since then, the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity have become icons of the left that
oppose authority, hierarchy, and obedience.8 Over time, the label took on new forms and adapted
mainly on the basis and whims of Global-North debates. Even though here is little consensus on the
universal meaning of this dichotomy, there are certain main concepts and ideas that can be found in
the sphere of political theory regarding the topic.
Norberto Bobbio provides a study of the divide that is continuously referenced in LR
dichotomic-centered literature. Bobbio’s central claim is that the two sides of the dichotomy can be
distinguished because of their different attitudes towards the value of “equality.”9 He points out that
the Left strives for greater equality and that the Right legitimizes inequality.10 His work thus seeks to

Catherine de Vries, Armen Hakhverdian and Bram Lancee, “The Dynamics of Voters' Left/Right Identification: The
Role of Economic and Cultural Attitudes,” Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge, (December 2013).
DOI:10.1017/psrm.2013.4
6 Gian Vittorio Caprara and Michele Vecchione, “On the Left and Right Ideological Divide: Historical Accounts and
Contemporary Perspectives,” Political Psychology, (February 13, 2018). https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12476
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ana Rita Ferreira and Joao Cardoso Rosas, Left and Right: The Great Dichotomy Revisited, Cambridge Scholars Publishing
(November 1, 2013).
10 Detlef Jahn, “Conceptualizing Left and Right in comparative politics: Towards a deductive approach,” (December 20,
2009). DOI: 10.1177/1354068810380091
5
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prove that the Left often challenges status quo conditions to ensure greater equal access for all while
the Right accepts the fact that inequality is heavily intertwined with existing political, economic, and
social structures. Moreover, Bobbio explains that the further to the Left one goes, the more
individuals tend to view human beings as fundamentally similar and deserving of equal treatment,
whereas the further to the Right one goes, the more difference is emphasized.11 Politics are
subsequently framed through a lens of inclusion and acceptance of differences in relation to seeking
equality. Empirical studies show that individuals tend to place themselves, parties, and politics along
a left-right spectrum according to this “equality criterion.”12
However, not all agree with Bobbio’s standards of measurement. Some argue that the LR
cleavage goes beyond mere equality. Ruish et al. claim that the animosity between those on the left
and right stems largely from the deep-seated differences in values, worldviews, and culture that
characterize those of opposing ideologies.13 Lep and Kirbiš find that the left-right dimension
contains two interrelated concepts, namely change vs. stability and rejection vs. acceptance of
inequality.14 These interpretations aim to add layers of complexity to the divide and demonstrate that
debates regarding political identification stretch past conversations surrounding equality. Others
state that Left/Right have no immutable or essential meanings, that they are orientational metaphors
which enable identification of subjects in relation to each other and the whole.15 Following this line
of thinking, the labels are then rendered useless outside of their antithetical relationship and fall

Peter Christoffer Espersen, “The Left-Right Dichotomy in Contemporary Democratic Theory,” Doctoral thesis,
University of East Anglia, (October 21, 2020). https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/77385/1/2019EspersenPCPhD.pdf
12 Ana Rita Ferreira and Joao Cardoso Rosas, Left and Right: The Great Dichotomy Revisited, Cambridge Scholars Publishing
(November 1, 2013).
13 Benjamin Coe Ruisch, Courtney Moore, Javier Granados Samayoa, Shelby Boggs, Jesse Ladanyi, Russell Fazio,
“Examining the Left-Right Divide Through the Lens of a Global Crisis: Ideological Differences and Their Implications
for Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Political Psychology, (May 5, 2021). https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12740
14 Žan Lep and Andrej Kirbiš, “Political orientation in youth beyond the left-right divide: testing a three-factor model of
political orientation and its relatedness to personal values,” Journal of Youth Studies, (June 10, 2021).
https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2021.1939285
15 Peter Christoffer Espersen, “The Left-Right Dichotomy in Contemporary Democratic Theory,” Doctoral thesis,
University of East Anglia, (October 21, 2020). https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/77385/1/2019EspersenPCPhD.pdf
11
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short when it comes to describing the complex nature of political realities. Charbonneau agrees with
this analysis and adds that “to describe the evolution of the Left and of the Right is to trace the
curve of their respective self-betrayals.”16 The latter can be described as a disillusioned examination
of the Left and the Right wherein the two forces have failed their fundamental tenets and hence
become virtually purposeless.
It is critical to note that the research above is mainly concerned with the political realities of
Europe and the US. Even though there has been a consistent push for a global narrative
surrounding notions of the left and the right, systems of governance and self/party-identifications
are incredibly fluid and thus often bypass the rigidity of the traditional divide. Because of this,
certain nations do not fit under the LR mold, at least as it is conceptualized historically. In most
countries across the globe, other political dimensions seem to influence politics more strongly than
Left and Right.17 Additionally, studies show that the dichotomy deviates significantly not only from
political agendas of the parties but also the perceptions of individuals.18 Society is far more complex
than this binomial separation. In order to better utilize the LR division as a standard for politics, one
must recognize that left and right do not operate invariantly across political contexts, nor are their
contents invariant across time.19 This logic can be extended to address inaccurate analyses of Global
South (GS) communities. The LR model is oftentimes not enough to reflect the various changes
political cultures in this region have undergone.

Alain de Benoist, “End of the Left-Right Dichotomy: The French Case,” Telos, (December 21, 1995).
http://alaindebenoist.s3.amazonaws.com/pdf/end_of_the_left-right.pdf
17 Detlef Jahn, “Conceptualizing Left and Right in comparative politics: Towards a deductive approach,” (December 20,
2009). DOI: 10.1177/1354068810380091
18 Žan Lep and Andrej Kirbiš, “Political orientation in youth beyond the left-right divide: testing a three-factor model of
political orientation and its relatedness to personal values,” Journal of Youth Studies, (June, 2021).
https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2021.1939285
19 Gian Vittorio Caprara and Michele Vecchione, “On the Left and Right Ideological Divide: Historical Accounts and
Contemporary Perspectives,” Political Psychology, (February 13, 2018). https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12476
16
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The aforementioned can be observed in Latin America, an incredibly complex and
multidimensional region that is often evaluated through a lens that pushes a narrative of assumed
homogeneity. This is apparent in the realm of LR assessments and took place as Latin America’s
“pink wave” engulfed the region. During this time, research focused heavily upon the continent’s
return to leftist politics by assuming that each Latin American leader on the left represented a piece
of the same monolithic umbrella.20 Most evaluations of Latin American leftist politics were,
therefore, based on a faulty assumption of regional uniformity. In reality, the LR divide is not as
straightforward as these academic studies presented it to be. Left-right attitudes in the continent are
fluid and vary across individuals and contexts.21
One of them relates to clientelism and its prevalence in Latin American politics.22 Studies
have demonstrated that clientelism may hinder an individual from developing consistent political
perceptions either by encouraging indifference toward the ideological left-right spectrum or by
increasing uncertainty in the political realm.23 Clientelism separates the general public from the
sphere of politics and political influence, encouraging a move away from political institutions as
these become tainted by corruption. A political party’s emphasis on clientelistic practices decreases
the coherence of voters’ left-right orientation with respect to their democratic values as well as their
economic representation.24 Because of this, in nations where clientelism is the norm—as it relates to
political power diffusion and consolidation—associations with the left and the right are muddled.

Nina Wiesehomeier, “The Meaning of Left-Right in Latin America: A Comparative View,” Kellogg Institute for
International Studies, (July 2010). https://kellogg.nd.edu/sites/default/files/old_files/documents/370_0.pdf
21 Saskia P. Ruth, “Clientelism and the Utility of the Left-Right Dimension in Latin America,” Latin American Politics and
Society 58, no. 1 (2016): 72–97. doi:10.1111/j.1548-2456.2016.00300.x.
22 “Clientelism refers to a system in which politicians, mostly through party machine operatives, offer goods, services, or
jobs to citizens with the expectation that these clients will return the favor with some form of political support.” Joby
Schaffer and Andy Baker, “Clientelism as Persuasion-Buying: Evidence from Latin America,” Comparative Political Studies,
48(9), (March 2015), https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015574881.
23 Saskia P. Ruth, “Clientelism and the Utility of the Left-Right Dimension in Latin America,” (2016).
24 Ibid.
20
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Even though this line of thinking may shed some light onto the political realities of Latin
American communities, this alone does not explain why LR centered studies can, at times, produce
monolithic analyses of the region. Clientelism is not inherently unique to Latin America. Jaffe and
Koster find that due to the way the phenomenon is framed and discussed in the Global North,
many practices in North America and Europe are not evaluated as clientelism even when they meet
clientelistic definitional standards.25 The aforementioned can be observed in the realm of urban
development as the “myth of Northern formality” has allowed activities and connections that would
generally be framed as clientelist or corrupt in the Global South to be rebranded as policy
innovation in Western Europe and North America.26 This ethnographic study highlights two critical
points: a) clientelism is not innately found on the basis of geographical location, and b) Global
North conceptualizations of issues are, at times, not even reflective of GN realities. Clientelistic
relationships in Latin America only tell a small part of the broader political narrative. Political
realities are heterogenous across time-space and differ on various contextual levels—national,
community, individual. This is especially true in places where populism has been injected into
mainstream politics.
Populism: a quick overview
Populism as a concept is widely contested. As the number of populist leaders and parties in
power continues to increase, scholars and academics have failed to establish a structured definition
of what it means to be populist. Many consider it to be a thin-centered ideology while others have
moved beyond this approach and study the phenomenon through a lens that takes into account that
the traditional binary between “the elite” and “the people” is not as straightforward as some

Rivke Jaffe and Martijn Koster, “The Myth of Formality in the Global North: Informality-as-Innovation in Dutch
Governance,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, (January 2019), DOI:10.1111/1468-2427.12706
26 Ibid.
25
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perceive it to be. Populism can be evaluated as an ideology, a strategy, a style, a form of political
discourse; below is a delineation of some of the main approaches.
Lisa Zanotti studies populism in Italy and considers the movement to be a “thin ideology
that conceives society ultimately divided into two homogeneous groups the ‘pure’ people vs. the
‘corrupt’ elite, and which argues that politics should be the expression of the volonté générale (general
will) of the people.”27 For her, populism represents a simplified and immediate method of
reconnecting voters to a political environment in the aftermath of traditional party system collapse.28
Even though her analysis of party system collapse holds great value and deserves further study,
labeling populism as “thin-centered” has been heavily challenged in recent years. Many who mark
populism as thin do so as a way to highlight the latter’s incapacity to provide fleshed-out and
extensive plans for society, as populist rhetoric is heavily contingent upon emotional messaging that
encourages division across various political, social, and economic lines. Thin-centered ideologies
present structural inability to offer complex ranges of argument because many chains of ideas are
simply absent; a thin-centered-ideology is hence limited in ideational ambitions and scope.29 Despite
the fact that many populist movements do not present structured ideas—and rather rely on
emotion-based messages to incite support—this labeling of thinness does not seem to be applicable
anymore, as it makes studies of populism rather weak in terms of range.
The author who coined the term, Michael Freeden, has recently countered populist
literature’s constant use of the label. He argues that populism is not a thin-centered ideology for this
term implies that there is potentially more than the center when in reality the populist core is all

Lisa Zanotti, “How’s Life After the Collapse? Populism as a Representation Linkage and the Emergence of a
Populist/Anti-Populist Political Divide in Italy (1994–2018),” Frontiers in Political Science, (July 6
2021). https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2021.679968
28 “A collapse is the result of the incapacity of most of the parties in the system to fulfill their basic function, i.e., to
represent voters’ interests,” Ibid.
29 Davide Vittori, "Re-Conceptualizing Populism: Bringing a Multifaceted Concept within Stricter Borders," Revista
Española De Ciencia Política no. 44 (07, 2017): 43-65. https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/re-conceptualizingpopulism-bringing-multifaceted/docview/1953099288/se-2?accountid=8361.
27

11
there is.30 He states that populism is “simply ideologically too scrawny even to be thin.”31 Nothing
can be built upon the core of populism as there is little to no ideological foundation for plans or
strategies to stand upon it; populism is continuously shifting, it does not adhere to singular concepts
or ideas. As Freeden states: populism emphasizes only those items on which it wishes to mobilize
public opinion and ignores the rest.32 So is populism an ideology? Freedmen, and other scholars, do
not view it as such. “Vagueness and indeterminacy” render it as something other.33 This ghost-like
mode of mobilization and governance—in its evasion of traditional academic standards—should
thus be evaluated differently. Contemporary academics of populism have brought forth many
alternatives.
Benjamin Moffit, in his study of Western European populism, argues that the latter is “a
political style that features an appeal to ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’, ‘bad manners’ and the
performance of crisis, breakdown or threat.”34 This approach encompasses the distinction between
the two categorical identities, the people and the elite, the in-group and the out-group, and how
these classifications are formed. It highlights the different norms and behaviors that make up each
category as “bad” manners refer to populism’s usurpation of accepted decorum and established
political norms. Extending this argument beyond the label of “style,” Kurt Weyland classifies
populism as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government
power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly
unorganized followers.35 Drawing upon the presented arguments and approaches one can thus

Benjamin Moffitt, “The Populism/Anti-Populism Divide in Western Europe,” Democratic Theory, (December 2018),
DOI:10.3167/dt.2018.050202
31 Michael Freeden, “After the Brexit referendum: revisiting populism as an ideology,” Journal of Political Ideologies,
(December 2016). https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2016.1260813
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Benjamin Moffitt, “The Populism/Anti-Populism Divide in Western Europe,” Democratic Theory, (December 2018),
DOI:10.3167/dt.2018.050202
35 Ibid.
30
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understand populism as a game of morphing definitions and antithetical narrative creation. The
different binaries, those of the people and the elite, can be anyone or anything at any point in time.
Power lies with the individual or party that can control the creation of political narratives. Populism
is reliant upon division, personalism, the collapse of traditional party systems, and crises—of the
state and of cultural identity.
Latin America and populism
Latin America has had a long and complicated history with populist rule, one marked by
repression, economic stagnation, and the stripping away of civil rights. Democracies and democratic
institutions have slowly suffocated under the grasp of populist leaders that have done near
irreversible damage to several nations across the region. Through the creation of a clear—yet also
disarmingly adaptive—dichotomy of “us vs them,” populist rhetoric enables the inclusion of certain
groups through the exclusion of others. It usually promises equity for those in lower income
brackets at the expense of the oligarchy and the traditional elite, and draws most of its legitimacy
from the “people” rather than the rule of law.36 Because of this, once in office populist leaders can
dismantle democratic institutions as they answer to no one other than their party (and often their
own interests), and feel no allegiance to the democratic systems that put them in office.
Waves of populism are nearly universal for at their very core, the messages and goals created
by populists can virtually adapt to any political context, regardless of where the party/leader may fall
on the LR political spectrum. It is not an ideology and holds no loyalty to either side of the political
spectrum; it a method of conveying messages which are reliant upon the constant polarization of
society. Democracies in Latin America no longer perish at the hands of a traditional military coups
but rather decay slowly through the erosion of democratic institutions.

Cachanosky, Nicolás and Alexandre Padilla, "Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century," The Independent
Review 24, no. 2 (Fall, 2019): 209-226. https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/latin-american-populism-twentyfirst-century/docview/2333941897/se-2?accountid=8361.
36
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Populism fundamentally alters political cultures and moves beyond traditional
conceptualizations of the left and the right. It is ideologically scrawny, meaning it does not adhere to
potential LR categorization; it is a malleable strategy and has the ability to change the very essence of
political environments. As explained by Zanotti, a new dimension of political competition based on
the contraposition between populism and anti-populism emerges in post-system collapse contexts.37
Her study of Italy can be applied to countries that have undergone similar post-collapse changes due
to populism, particularly in Latin American nations. Zanotti’s evaluation lays the foundation for the
following chapter.
The relevance of the left-right dimension has traditionally been dismissed by students of
politics in Latin American countries, where it has been supposed that political parties are not
strongly ideological oriented, but rather populist, personalistic and clientelistic.38 Moreover, Latin
America appears to lack classic liberal parties and additionally contain a breed of anti-liberal parties
and presidents which/who are right on social policy yet left on economics.39 How does one account
for these paradoxical disparities? By digging deeper into historical and status quo conditions of
democratic saliency.
The LR divide cannot be accurately utilized in nations where ideological divisions are not
truly made on the basis of the left and right. Even though Latin American parties utilize titles of left
and right, these pledges to a specific side of the dichotomy alone do not truly explain the region’s
various political environments. This is especially true in the case of Argentina. To understand
Argentina, and the ways in which her democracy functions (or doesn’t), one must understand the

Lisa Zanotti, “How’s Life After the Collapse? Populism as a Representation Linkage and the Emergence of a
Populist/Anti-Populist Political Divide in Italy (1994–2018),” Frontiers in Political Science, (July 6
2021). https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2021.679968
38 Joseph Colmer, “The Left-Right Dimension in Latin America,” SSRN Electronic Journal, (March 2005).
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/23695583_The_Left-Right_Dimension_in_Latin_America
39 Nina Wiesehomeier, “The Meaning of Left-Right in Latin America: A Comparative View,” Kellogg Institute for
International Studies, (July 2010). https://kellogg.nd.edu/sites/default/files/old_files/documents/370_0.pdf
37

14
history and contemporaneous manifestations of populism and anti-populism. To categorize
Argentina as either a country of the left or the right, at any point in time since 1946, would be to
wholly overlook the makeup and complexity of her political reality.
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Chapter Two: A Warped Political Environment
The literature on populism is convoluted at best. A lack of precision and consensus as it
relates to standards of measurements and definitions has created an environment wherein academics
can barely agree on how to study populism, much less on what the phenomenon is fundamentally.
Chapter One briefly mentions the varying definitions and tools that have been utilized to demarcate
what makes a movement, government, or leader “populist.” However, populist-based studies face
the risk of crumbling from the inside out. Contemporaneously, anything and everything can be
labeled as populist without any regards for verified accuracy. Discourse and ambiguity in academia
are vital for its maintenance and continued evolution; however, an absence of foundational or
accepted frameworks of analyses have led many to label populism as a buzzword. Thus, the problem
this project seeks to address is two-fold as 1) the left/right binary has been wrongly operationalized
in cases where populist movements, leaders or parties have entered the political theater, and 2) the
study of populism itself has conceptually stretched, slowly nearing its breaking point. 40
Revisiting Chapter One: populism and conceptual stretching
Despite decades of study and the continued growth of self-proclaimed populist leaders, there
exists a self-sustaining vacuum in academia wherein near anything can be considered populist.41 This
disjointed and unprecise use of the populist label, and the uncoordinated application of standards of
measurement, has often led to inconclusive analyses of populist governments; it has ultimately bred
conceptual confusion. The latter prevails when different scholars emphasize divergent attributes as

Falling into the trap of conceptual stretching means identifying two different phenomena by the same name, or
making “pseudo-equivalences” that do not differentiate between phenomena. Levi Marsteintredet and Andrés Malamud,
“Coup with Adjectives: Conceptual Stretching or Innovation in Comparative Research?” Political Studies, 68(4), (2020).
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719888857
41 For more see Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press,
(2017).
40
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defining characteristics of the same concept.42 Some scholars conceptualize populism as an ideology;
others evaluate it solely as a strategy, while many analyze it through a stylistic lens. The problem of
conceptual confusion or stretching is not inherently unique to populism. In fact, it seems to be an
endemic issue within the entirety of the social sciences branch. As explained by David Collier and
Steven Levitsky in their study of democracies and the definitional debates surrounding the topic:
since scholars are concerned with issues of conceptual stretching, there has been a proliferation of
alternative conceptual forms of what it means to be a democracy.43 This has resulted in a surprising
number of subtypes involving democracy “with adjectives” such as “authoritarian democracies” or
“neopatrimonial democracies.”44 The same can be found in populist literature.
Academics have created subcategories for what they consider to be different strands of the
same populist nucleus. Consequently, a range of labels have been attached to the title of populism
itself including: false, political, economic, authoritarian, left-wing, right-wing, inclusionary,
exclusionary. The list is virtually endless. And it unfortunately does not get anyone far. Within these
distinctions—all based on different cases and which use different definitional bases—there is little to
no agreement on the overall definition of what it means to be populist. This is problematic since the
enterprise of comparative politics depends upon the formation of clearly defined concepts and is
threatened by conceptual stretching.45
The aforementioned refers to instances where scholars expand their comparative perspective
and tend to broaden the meaning of a concept to be able to incorporate under its expanded rubric

Kurt Weyland, “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin America,” Comparative Politics, 34 (1),
(October, 2001). https://www.jstor.org/stable/422412
43 David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,”
World Politics, (1997). https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/levitsky/files/SL_democracy-adjectives.pdf
44 David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,”
World Politics, (1997). https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/levitsky/files/SL_democracy-adjectives.pdf
45 Sophia Hunger and Fred Paxton, “What’s in a buzzword? A systematic review of the state of populism research in
political science,” Political Science Research and Methods, (2021). doi:10.1017/psrm.2021.44
42
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the larger realm of observations.46 Through this expansion words and titles lose their essence. Sense
and connotation disappear and are absorbed into the self-sustaining vacuum. Hence, once reaches
the modern populist dilemma: what is populism? The cycle appears to be never ending. In order to
address the issue, I argue for a definitional re-calibration, a re-visitation of what populism is on a
fundamental level; from this center, it may possible to reach better and more precise conclusions on
the subject. To do so, it is imperative to evaluate populism as a discursive frame and to apply this
standard of measurement to historical and contemporaneous examples (such as Argentina) hand-inhand with analyses of anti-populist coalitions.
Populism as discursive frame
At its very heart, populism is a game of antithetical definitions, one contingent upon
perpetual and/or self-sustaining systems of polarization. Because of this, the foundation of
“discursive frame” should be adopted to understand the phenomenon, as this allows for the most
nuanced and precise evaluations of populist leaders, movements, coalitions, and governments.
Populism as a concept has been housed by a plethora of different approaches. The term has,
therefore, been evaluated as an ideology, strategy, discourse or political style.47 Yet, these divergent
structures of knowledge have yielded wildly opposing conclusions, all claiming to apply to the same
overarching label of “populism.” Assertions—both conclusive and ambiguous—are thus based on
exceptionally vague conceptualization of populism; and several authors have warned about the risk
of conflating populism with its host ideologies.48
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Most scholars defer to Mudde’s definition of populism as an ideology that “considers society
to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus
‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale
(general will) of the people.”49 There are three core elements to Mudde’s typification: the elites, ‘the
people,’ and who should be included and excluded and included in ‘the people.’50 By demarcating the
inclusionary and exclusionary facets of various populist leaders and movements, Mudde attempts to
differentiate between what are considered right and left-wing populisms. Rightist populisms are
exclusionary (often of immigrant populations) while leftist populisms focus on the inclusivity of
working-class communities.51 The latter definition additionally includes and has been further marked
by an attachment of thinness as an adjective/descriptor. Mudde borrows from Michael Freeden’s
study of nationalism and consequently argues that populism is ideologically thin. Accordingly, the
phenomenon can be understood as an ideology focused on a single issue or one that appends itself
to other ideologies to thicken out; it does not provide comprehensive solutions to most sociopolitical problems as grand ideologies (like liberalism and socialism) do.52
However, even though this approach has been the most utilized by academics in the field,
many critique it. Michael Freeden himself has even refuted and revisited academia’s tendency to
conflate populism with fleshed-out ideologies. According to Freeden, “a thin-centered ideology
implies that there is potentially more than the center, but the populist core is all there is; it is not a
potential center for something broader or more inclusive.”53 He adds that populism is emaciated
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rather than thin-centered.54 There is not enough in the populist nucleus to allow for the creation of
an ideological framework. Under populist rule there are no specific plans for society, there are only
vague allusions to a brighter future, a reframing of political decorum and rules, accompanied by a
lack of solid policy proposals. There is no “Populist International,” no sacred texts upon which
populist disciples can draw inspiration, no universally revered populist icons, and no acknowledged
historical continuity among populist manifestations.55 As an ideology populism is a wraith, everchanging and ever-moving, with no history or ideological tenets to stand upon.
Some have additionally pointed that Mudde’s definition has led to an overlooking of the
various complexities and critical differences that exist within the populist umbrella. Ernesto Laclau’s
work stands in stark opposition to Mudde and is one of the most utilized in relation to moving
beyond the ideological implications of Muddean standards. Laclau argues that what defines
populism is not the ideological content of the demands being put forward, but rather the fact that
those anti-systemic claims are brought together into a counter-hegemonic formation and take a
particular shape.56 According to the scholar, a movement is not populist because its politics or
ideology present actual contents identifiable as populistic, but because it shows a particular logic of
articulation of those contents—whatever those contents are.57 To understand populism, one must
look beyond the promises put forward by the populist, and rather examine how these claims are
communicated and performed. Moffit in 2016, examines the performative nature of populist politics
and contends that populism is “a political style that features an appeal to ‘the people’ versus ‘the
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elite’, ‘bad manners’ and the performance of crisis, breakdown or threat.”58 Bad manners in this
context refers to the populist tendency to move away from the established decorum generally
expected in politics. He adds: “where the discursive and stylistic approaches [for studying populism]
push the literature forward is that they firstly recognize populism as a gradational rather than binary
category, thus opening up more nuance in the study of populism; and secondly, they take seriously
the role and processes of representation and identity formation under populism, and consequently
the drawing of lines between ‘the people’ and other political identities.”59 Because of this,
contemporaneous studies on populism are attempting to incorporate such frameworks, though more
must be done.
Many scholars additionally criticize the normative implications of Mudde’s definition—
wherein words such as “corrupt” and “pure” are arbitrarily utilized and applied to a range of
different movements. Some believe that this can lead to an overlooking of the potential benefits that
populist discourse provides for the creation of space designed for critiques and appraisals of the
status quo. Academics, such as Mudde, Kaltwasser and Müller, have argued that populists’ claim to
represent “the people” and their criticism of “the elite” are inherently anti-pluralist because of an
implied homogenization of “the people.”60 This idea, some attest, ignores how populist parties and
movements can, at times, be inclusionary in their normative vision and pluralist in the way they seek
to achieve this normative vision.61 It is critical to note, however, that this is the exception as opposed
to the rule; the latter rarely happens for one of the main performative pillars of populism is its
dependency upon perpetual polarization. Additionally, populism in power often leads to the shirking
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of democratic spaces. Regardless, many contemporaneous academics show that moving away from
an ideological understanding of populism can provide scholars with a more nuanced and analytically
complex assessments of populism.62 This is because Mudde’s minimal definition inadvertently
ignores that populism can fit under the framework of democracy. As argued by Aslandis “portraying
populism as ideology swells the scope and purported impact of the phenomenon and forces analysts
to take sides in favor of or against it. The normative implications of populism have plagued the
literature and crippled its evolution into a respected theory.”63 Critiquing the status quo or the
establishment is not innately anti-democratic, in fact the ability to do so is vital for the maintenance
and endurance of democracies everywhere. Democratic saliency is contingent upon the model’s
ability to be fluid and dynamic, to provide citizens with choices, and to ultimately withstand/weather
critiques. Populist arguments are not always innately anti-democratic, although the framework often
times becomes a stepping stone into democratic backsliding and erosion since it clashes with
accountability and the rule of law. Populist leaders are anti-democratic in the ways that they
communicate and perform politics before and during their time in office; they are anti-pluralist once
they usurp and bypass democratic channels such as checks and balances or the needed separation of
powers within government. However, the only way to truly reach this conclusion is by moving away
from an ideologically-based understanding of populism and evaluating it as a discursive frame.
Populists hold no loyalty to either side of the political spectrum.
Focusing solely on ideology constricts access to knowledge as it obscures the many other
elements that makeup how parties or leaders seek to rule a particular population. Mudde’s minimal
definition does not consider key components of populism such as populist styles of communication
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and leadership, or its strategies.64 Parties, leaders, and movements do not attempt to rule solely on an
ideological basis as this is simply not enough to enable mass mobilization. Politics do not merely
exist within the confines of ideology; political clashes are ultimately defined, shaped, and altered by
how ideological claims/statements are framed and presented. Because of this, populism should be
understood as a discursive frame. Borrowing from Aslandis’ work, I adhere to the frame-based
structure of knowledge as the better alternative for studying populism.
This re-calibration of the populist definition brings political communication into focus and
underscores its importance in relation to politics and governance. Populist discourse, through this
lens, can be perceived as the systematic dissemination of a frame that diagnoses reality as
problematic because “corrupt elites” have unjustly usurped the sovereign authority of the “noble
people” and maintains that the solution to the problem resides in the righteous political mobilization
of the latter in order to regain power.65 Populism can be fundamentally boiled down to the ways in
which the antithetical relationship between “the people” and “the elite” is communicated and
performed. Populist framing is just another tool of persuasion in the arsenal of political agents. 66 As
a result, one can observe populist parties, movements and leaders bypassing the
constrictions/limitations presented by ideology. Populism should not, therefore, be linked to a
specific economic system, nor to a crisis of accumulation but should be understood instead as a
resource permanently available to politicians offering sweeping illusions and easy solutions to the
increasingly complex problems of increasingly complex societies.67 As such, it moves beyond the
left-right political binary for it is simply another form of performance politics; the dichotomy
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between “elites” and “people” is not ideologically-based. As theorized by Laclau: “the populist form
pits a certain ‘people’ against a certain ‘power bloc’, but both subjectivities are ‘empty signifiers’,
symbolic vessels filled with particular content depending on the specifics of the political context
within which they are invoked and the cultural toolbox at work.”68
Populism is a moving target that has evolved with the passage of time. Academia must
attempt to capture its essence without being too constricting or conflating. Studying populist
rhetoric through the discursive frame allows for this. The discursive frame establishes that a populist
logic can be invoked to further very different political goals, from radical left to right, or from
progressive to regressive.69 It recognizes a populist’s lack of ties to ideology, and provides space for
the incorporation of anti-populism in discussions surrounding populist movements.
Crises and total party collapse
Political environments are intrinsically conditioned by a nation-state’s political culture, and
vice versa. The latter is defined as the norms and values that relate to a political system, and the
particular distributions of patterns of orientation toward political objects among members of the
nation.70 As populism is injected into the political theater, the rules and norms that define a
particular environment inherently change. This is not only due to the disruptive nature of populist
movements, but additionally caused by the formation of anti-populist coalitions. The dichotomic
model presented by populism—that of the us vs. them—is replicated by those who wish to take a
stand against populists, and often leads to further political polarization. This stark divide warps the
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political realities of a nation for political clashes are consequently no longer framed around
traditional ideological divides but rather on the basis of populist vs anti-populist.
Despite the continuous progress done in this field, comparatively little analysis has been
done on anti-populism. As explained by Joan Miro in 2018, “the one aspect that has gone unnoticed
in this intellectual crusade has been the political discourse articulated by non-populist political actors
to counter populist irruptions.”71 This lack of research on the subject has left analyses of populism
to be both inconclusive and incomplete for one cannot truly evaluate populism without studying its
counterpart. The populism/anti-populism frontier is first determined by the appearance of populist
rhetoric and movements into mainstream political discourses. Populism is not born out of thin air;
rather, the phenomenon should be understood as the ramification of constant failures, real and
imagined, within political ecosystems. Anti-populism, on the other hand, can be studied as the
response of the failing system to account for past mistakes, and essentially an attempt to salvage
existing political infrastructure.
As explained by Lisa Zanotti, the populist/anti-populist divide is born out of “party system
collapse.”72 In her analysis of this split in Italy, Zanotti describes a collapse as the result of the
incapacity of most of the parties in the political system to fulfill their basic function of representing
voters’ interests.73 After presenting a detailed study of the Italian party system collapse in 1994 and
its consequences, Zanotti includes examples that extend beyond European borders. She explains
that after the collapse of their respective political systems, Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela
experienced the emergence of a new cleavage between those for and those against populist leaders.74
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This alteration, caused by a new form of political competition, stemmed from a series of crises that
further separated the people from the institutions meant to protect them. If political movements fail
their constituents in this regard, voters will start to look for options outside of the limits demarcated
by traditional party alliances. Disappointment within political environments can often lead to
feelings of detachment by voters and can create the appeal for antiestablishment parties; this is
where populist leaders come in. Populist rhetoric diffuses more quickly if dissatisfaction with the
political system as a whole has corroded people’s confidence in established parties and leaders. In
these cases, an usurpation of political norms and expectations of decorum are welcomed. Crises—
natural and imagined—play a critical role in perpetuating institution-based disillusionment and crisis
creation/manipulation is both an internal and external condition of populism.
Populist narrative creation is contingent upon the existence and perpetuation of crises. This
category can entail an array of conditions: economic, cultural, political, social. Populism’s emergence
has been historically linked to a crisis of the dominant ideological discourse, which in turn is part of
a more general social crisis.75 Issues within the ideological sphere essentially morph into critiques of
the overall societal apparatus; to study this phenomenon, one must utilize the aforementioned
discursive frame. This is because, as explained by Galanopoulos and Venizelos in 2021, populists
construct discursively and maintain a situation of crisis for political benefit.76 Crisis is both a catalyst
and an effect of populism. Crises do not just trigger populism, populism also attempts to act as a
trigger for crisis as the latter are always mediated and performed.77 Many scholars contend that
prominent populist figures would not have emerged had it not been for the existence and

Yannis Stavrakaks, Giorgos Katsambekis, Alexandros Kioupkiolis, Nikos Nikisianis and Thomas Siomos, “Populism,
anti-populism and crisis,” Contemporary Political Theory, Vol. 17, (August 2, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296-0170142-y
76 Antonis Galanopoulos and Giorgos Venizelos, “Anti-populism and Populist Hype During the COVID-19 Pandemic,”
Representation, (December 2021). DOI:10.1080/00344893.2021.2017334
77 Benjamin Moffit, “How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary
Populism,” Government and Opposition, 50 (2) (2015). doi:10.1017/gov.2014.13
75

26
propagation of crises. In the case of Argentina, without the progressive erosion of the oligarchical
system of the 1930s, the rise of Juan Perón would have been unthinkable.78 The same logic can be
applied to contemporary forms of populism. Alberto Fernandez, Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, Jair
Bolsonaro, these are all leaders that could not have gained popular support without national crises of
identity. And even though each figure provides a different manifestation of populist politics,
narrative creation contingent upon real/imagined threats was critical for their rise to power.
The importance of crises is two-fold, one the one hand they can act as a trigger for the
injection of populist rhetoric into mainstream politics; on the other, populist parties, leaders and
movements oftentimes construct imagined crises as a means for gaining and maintaining power.
These imagined threats can include anything from the villainization of out-groups or marginalized
communities, the discrediting of external international systems, and the slandering of democratic
institutions. Moffit delineates six steps in the “performance” of crisis that populist leaders undergo:
1) identity failure, 2) elevate to the level of crisis by linking into a wider framework and adding a
temporal dimension, 3) frame ‘the people’ vs. those responsible for the crisis, 4) use media to
propagate performance, 5) present simple solutions and strong leadership, and 6) continue to
propagate crisis.79 This is the strategy utilized by populist leaders to exert control over political
systems; the question then becomes: how does the system respond to the populist attacks?
Including anti-populism in the study of populism
Once populism politics become mainstream, backlash can be felt throughout the political
theater. This counter-attack against populist rhetoric oftentimes takes the form of anti-populist
coalitions. Even though their existence is not novel, little attention and energy has been spent
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attempting to figure out how the relationship between populism and anti-populism affects a nation’s
political culture. Most available analyses of populism ultimately fail to take into account the wider
hegemonic environment within which populist actors have to operate.80 Populism does not exist
isolated from the rest of society; this form of political performance interacts, clashes and cooperates
with other movements, leaders, and parties. Because of this, anti-populism should be more
thoroughly examined. This paper argues for the continued study of anti-populism in relation to
populism, and further contends that this particular political clash—which can stretch across timespace, often bleeding into contemporary debates—bypasses traditional conceptualizations of on the
basis of either left or right (as presented by the LR dichotomy).
Anti-populism as a concept faces the same definitional challenges as populism and is
accompanied by a comparatively miniscule body of literature from which to pull. The way antipopulism is presented and analyzed (in the rare chance that it is studied) shifts depending on the
school of thought that one subscribes to regarding the dangers posed by populist rhetoric. For
some, those who see the value to be found within the criticisms presented by populism, antipopulism is an elitist movement tainted by reactionary biases. Through this lens, anti-populism is
primarily characterized by its profound aversion to populism, its indiscriminate usage of the term,
and its reinforcement of the negative consequences of the phenomenon.81 Because of this, antipopulism has oftentimes been marked by its elitist tendencies to overly defend the status quo. Antipopulists have been found to identify challenges to “centrist” political positions as extreme, or
flirting with authoritarianism.82 It is important to note, however, that these assessments generally
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stem from Western European or North American evaluations. And although anti-populist coalitions
can house elite elements or individuals, anti-populist coalitions predominantly form in the defense of
neoliberal democracy. Whether that system is worth defending is not within the scope of this paper.
For others, anti-populism represents those forces wishing to maintain and uphold
democratic ideals during a time where democratic institutions are under fire. Ostiguy in 2017,
defines both populism and anti-populism in terms of opposition between the “low” and “high,”
where the “low” is associated with the populist tendency to personalism and coarseness, and is in
direct opposition to the “high,” often represented by the traditional parties, which claim to support
institutions, legal procedures and proper manners 83 Ostiguy’s approach is useful in that it carries
little normative baggage, and makes clear that populism as well as anti-populism do not
automatically reside on a particular side of the ideological spectrum.84 Under this, definition antipopulism is seen as adhering to the norms and behaviors expected of those within traditional
political theaters. “High” and “low” are incredibly malleable and dynamic signifiers; they fit cultural
contexts and mold in accordance to specific moments in time. Many have tried to reconstruct the
debate around the elitist undertones of anti-populism by pointing to bottoms-up anti-populist
coalitions. An example of the this can be found in the Sardine movement. The Italian Sardine
Movement emerged as a reaction to the populism of the Lega, a radical party led by Matteo Salvini
of Italy.85 In her study of the latter, Soraya Hamdaoui demonstrates how the movement stems from
the Italian people’s efforts as a response to the inability by Italian political parties to successfully
vocalize anti-populist sentiment. The Sardine’s anti-populist stylistic approach is three-pronged and

See Ostiguy 2017 and Moffit 2018; Massimiliano Demata, Michelangelo Conoscenti, and Yannis Stavrakakis, “Riding
the Populist Wave Metaphors of Populism and Anti-Populism in the Daily Mail and The Guardian,” Iperstoria, (2020).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13136/2281-4582/2020.i15.686
84 Benjamin Moffitt, “The Populism/Anti-Populism Divide in Western Europe,” Democratic Theory, (December 2018),
DOI:10.3167/dt.2018.050202
85 Soraya Hamdaoui, “A “stylistic anti-populism”: an analysis of the Sardine movement’s opposition to Matteo Salvini in
Italy,” Social Movement Studies, (March, 2021). https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2021.1899910
83

29
includes: 1) seeking to re-introduce politeness and respect in the discourse by contrasting with the
exuberant style of Salvini, 2) intending to re-mobilize citizens as physical persons by organizing
peaceful demonstrations that counterbalance Salvini’s visibility and ubiquitous presence on social
media, 3) aiming to put back complexity at the center of politics and to break with the simplistic and
Manichean populist discourse.86 They aren’t affiliated with a political party and, according to one of
their founders, they have no ambition to become one; moreover one study found that 40% of
Italians regard the Sardines to be a greater threat to Salvini than his actual political opponents. 87 The
Sardine’s breakaway from the inherent biases that can exist within the anti-populist umbrella point
to two critical realities. On the one hand, their mobilization successes—and lack of concrete ties to
traditional political parties—demonstrate the importance of bottoms-up approaches to antipopulism. These are those approaches in which the people recognize the value of democratic
channels and choose to stand against their usurpation at the hands of populist leaders. On the other,
the Sardines showcase those strands of anti-populism that are not fully in support of the status quo
but that understand the importance of democratic institutions, and the threat presented by populist
coalitions.
Although conceptualizations and definitions of anti-populism vary, all of the delineated
above mention the phenomenon’s hostility towards populism, its defense of established norms and
institutions, and its ideological diversity. Utilizing the discursive approach—which breeds the least
normatively charged definitional standards—anti-populism can be understood as discourse that
posits itself in radical opposition to populism, creating an antagonistic frontier between pro-populist
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and anti-populist forces.88 Moreover, anti-populism is not a clear ideological disposition or mode of
governance, but rather an odd mix of ideological and strategic bedfellows pulled together in a
temporary alliance of opposition to populism.89 The anti-populists tend to deconstruct the old leftright divide, but in order to constitute a united anti-populist front.90 The same logic can be applied
to populism as both styles pluck from across the ideological spectrum. Because of this, anti-populist
coalitions can virtually stem from any side of the political theater. This can lead to the creation of
alliances between governments, parties, and movements that would have regularly competed against
one another. As mentioned earlier: “a new dimension of political competition based on the
contraposition between populism and anti-populism emerged in post-collapse contexts.” Postcollapse contexts refer to moments wherein unresponsiveness by the democratic system leads to
realities where major parties are not able to attract enough support to maintain an electoral coalition
as they turn into empty vessels without a base of support.91 This dichotomy then becomes the main
definer of political clashes. Thus, evaluations in countries where this level of collapse takes place
should be based around this spilt as opposed to the left-right divide. Studying anti-populism handin-hand with populism is vital as this antagonistic battle—once injected into the mainstream political
theater—defines shapes and molds political cultures/realities more so than the left and right divide.
Conclusion
This Chapter sought to present the main problems and debates found within populistcentered literature, and further advocates for the utilization of a discursive frame of analysis in the
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study of both populism and anti-populism. Populist-centered literature faces the risk of conceptually
stretching to the point of breaking; were this to happen, populism would become a virtually
meaningless word and studying it would be near-impossible. Contemporaneously the label of
populist is being used without established definitional criteria or accepted standards of
measurement. Additionally, evaluations of populism rarely include evaluations of anti-populism,
which can lead to inaccurate conclusions on the subject as anti-populism faces similar definitional
challenges. Populism does not exist in its own pocket of time-space, separate from the rest of the
political ecosystem. It is imperative that this field recognize the latter and begin adding to the little
body of literature that exists on anti-populism.
The populism/anti-populism divide is one of the most important—and perhaps one of the
most understudied—cleavages in political studies. In those post-system collapse nations, populism
and anti-populism define political cultures, clashes, and alliances. Ideology is background noise, as
both frames draw from across the political spectrum. Thus, populism and by extension antipopulism bypass the LR dichotomy in two main ways:
1. Populist and anti-populist rhetoric is not inherently based on ideology as conceptualized by
the left-right divide, and
2. Populist and anti-populist coalitions are never just made up of elements from either the left
or the right as understood by the LR model. Coalitions on both sides are conglomerations of
various, and oftentimes opposing, political elements within political theaters.
This theoretical assessment can be applied to specific nations. The case of Argentina provides a
comprehensive evaluation of the LR dichotomy vis-à-vis populism. Analyzing Argentina’s Peronist
movement, and by including its anti-populist challengers—since their inception in the 1940s to the
status quo—can provide examples for how to begin to rebuild academia from within, starting with
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the pursuit of definitions that reflect reality, that encompass the diversity found in political
theaters/clashes. Chapters Three and Four focus on these goals.
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Chapter Three: A Historiography of Peronism (1940-1976)
Populism has been thoroughly picked apart by academics, poked and prodded to its very
core in recent decades. Even more so since the election of former U.S. president Donald J. Trump.
Other events, such as the referendum result in favor of Brexit or Marine Le Pen’s reaching of the
second round of elections for the French Presidency, has contributed to the impression that
contemporary politics “has entered an era of global populism.”92 Yet despite these claims, populism
is not new. This discursive strategy of politics is not inherently unique or innately specific to a
particular moment in time or region. Populist leaders, parties, coalitions, and movements have
managed to infiltrate and co-exist alongside mainstream political discourse for centuries. The latter
can be seen in Latin America which has experienced what scholars categorize as different waves of
populism; these include: classical, neoliberal, and progressive.93 Appraising the development of
populist and anti-populist politics in Latin America is critical, as the latter can aid in the definitional
re-framing of political studies brought forward in Chapters One and Two.
Argentina is a near-perfect example of the changes, challenges, and disruptions that a
political culture undergoes once populism becomes institutionalized, as it manages to inject itself
into the mainstream political theater. A historical evaluation of Argentina’s Peronist movement,
alongside an interrogation of anti-populist movements which spurred as a result—as a challenge or
alternative to Peronism—provide an application of the theoretical assessments constructed in the
previous two chapters. Understanding the populist/anti-populist divide is the only way one can
properly make sense of Argentinian politics. Both Peronism and its competitors bypass the divide
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established by the LR political spectrum. To know Peronism, its history, and its anti-populist
challengers, is to truly know the nation.
Pierre Ostiguy: a new method for understanding Argentina
In 2009, scholar and academic, Pierre Ostiguy published a comprehensive research project
titled “Argentina’s Double Political Spectrum: Party System, Political Identities and Strategies.” His
work has since then provided the necessary standards and evaluative tools to study Argentinian
politics. As explained by Ostiguy, “although left and right are highly relevant in Argentine politics
and within Argentina’s party system or political space, the main political cleavage in Argentina is
most definitely not defined in left-right terms.”94 He additionally argues that the main divide in
Argentinian politics is that of Peronism and anti-Peronism. Despite this, many still believe the
country to exist within a relatively straightforward and Global North-based ideological spectrum of
left and right. A detailed exploration of the nation’s history challenges the latter assumption and
showcases the fluid, heterogeneous and often contradictory nature of politics in Argentina. Ostiguy’s
study functions as a general framework that this study will expand upon. His impressive and
extensive research additionally demonstrates that populism is not ideologically-based. Argentina’s
own strand of populist politics—Peronism—has undergone a series of radical changes since the
movement’s inception in the 1940s. These alterations have led to a constant influx and shift in
political alliances that are not constricted by leftist or rightist ideological tendencies. In Argentinian
politics, ideology (as conceptualized through this traditional/binomial lens of left and right) comes
second in the political calculations made by both leaders and voters. This chapter combines the
work of Ostiguy with that of the scholars highlighted in Chapter Two and aims to demonstrate how
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these ever-changing alliances, made along the lines dictated by populism/anti-populism, support the
theory that populism is not an ideology but rather a discursive frame for understanding politics.
Perón: the birth of Peronism (1943-1955)
Juan Domingo Perón is a figure that has haunted Argentina’s history since the 1940s. His
rise to power and continued immortalization—through Peronist coalition-building—can be
understood as the epicenter of the populist/anti-populist rupture. From his ascension into the
presidency, one can analyze the trajectory of populist politics in Argentina. He is the root cause, the
ever-present ghost Peronist politicians rely upon for mass mobilization and the promotion of party
unity. Since the 1940s, the main political cleavage in Argentina has been Peronism versus antiPeronism.95 This division has not been static though, and it is vital to recognize that each Peronist
president, coalition, and movement has brought about changes within the party. There are no
specific ideological tenets Peronists have ever followed, at least not consistently. Peronism is a
matter of performance, it is a frame by which politicians attempt to manage political power and
practice politics. Studying the Peronist nucleus, Juan Perón’s presidencies, will provide a clear
picture of the movement’s genesis, and its “ideological” diffusion over time.
The Peronist period began in 1943, long before then-General Juan Doming Perón reached
the Argentinian presidency.96 Perón’s involvement in a coup d’état that year propelled him into a
position of substantial power within the Argentinian political apparatus. He became popular for his
work as Secretary of Labor as he passed decrees that substantially expanded labor and social rights.97
Through legislation that benefited the previously overlooked working class, Perón gradually created
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links between himself and Argentinian workers. Despite this network of connections, plenty within
Argentinian society viewed the regime created in 1943 as a threat. The coup was a catalyst for a
perpetual clash between the academic community and the political/military sectors of society. The
fracture was inherited and extended through Perón’s first administration period (1946-1955).98 After
the usurpation of power took place in ‘43, intellectuals and university professors signed a manifesto
that condemned the actions of the military authorities which had expelled the previous president. 99
This triggered a response by the regime in which the Minister of Justice and Public Instruction,
Gustavo Martínez Zuviría, claimed that the Supreme Court of Justice had declared communism
illegal and announced that all students and professors who participated in “subversive actions or
propaganda” would be expelled from the university.100 This division of academics/intellectuals and
the military continued to evolve during Perón’s first presidential term; it ultimately changed the ways
in which scientific debates and pursuits were both framed and carried out.
Perón’s election to the presidency derives from a range of factors merging at a powerful
convergence point. The progressive erosion of the oligarchical system in the 1930s, the massive
internal migration of politically inexperienced lower income people into urban centers, the
accumulation of communist and socialist union struggles, and the interests of unrepresented elites all
play a role in his ascension into power.101 Perón was a charismatic, nationalistic, military leader who
borrowed from fascist leaders in Europe such as Hitler and Mussolini. Peronism proclaimed
Justicialismo as its core corporatist “ideology,” which relied on three basic principles founded on
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Social Christian values: social justice, political sovereignty, and economic independence. 102 To adhere
to these values Perón presented Peronism as a third way between capitalism and communism, a
chameleonic method of practicing politics that borrowed from the left and the right. Perón, like all
corporatist theorists, was nearer to liberalism than to Marxism.103 Corporatism relates to the theory
and practice of organizing society into “corporations” subordinate to the state; according to
corporatist theory, workers and employers would be organized into industrial and professional
corporations serving as organs of political representation and controlling to a large extent the
persons and activities within their jurisdiction.104 Perón considered socialism and communism to
herald from the same deficient Marxist branch and critiqued capitalism for being a cold, inhuman
force of accumulation.105 Thus, mobilization operated through a bypassing of ties to either capitalism
or communism. His objective was forging an alliance between labor and capital with the
encouragement of the Army and the Church yet he relied on labor unions for the majority of
support.106 In doing so, he dictated political clashes through a utilization of the “us vs. them”
narrative framework traditionally employed by populist leaders. He used the empty signifier
(established by Laclau and presented in Chapter Two) of “the people” to garner support. He posited
himself as the people’s direct link to democracy and subsequently usurped channels of democracy
and potential avenues for those wishing to oppose his administration (such as the press or
universities).
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Peronism was, and continues to be, a populist movement. Mobilization efforts entailed the
inclusion of previously neglected elements of society such as the working class or new industrialists
through the exclusion of other socio-cultural and class groups. Before being elected as president
“the enemy” were those in the upper echelons of society. This included the landed oligarchy, the
business establishment, and anything related to “Yankee imperialism.”107 He incited stark division
between the national body along this binary of “us and them,” and found a way to navigate those
divisions as he pleased. Peronism has never been ideologically bound by anything other than power.
Because of this, it fits under the discursive frame definition delineated in Chapter Two. Through this
lens, populist movements like Peronism can be defined as the systematic dissemination of a frame
that diagnoses reality as problematic because “corrupt elites” have unjustly usurped the sovereign
authority of the “noble people” and maintains that the solution to the problem resides in the
righteous political mobilization of the latter in order to regain power.108
On February 24, 1946, Juan Perón became president of Argentina with a sweeping majority
vote. He heralded what some scholars label as the “Peronist revolution” and brought forward a set
of unconventional political alliances that cut across class and social sectors. Peronism included the
emergent national industrialists as well as politically marginal civil and military right-wing and Social
Christian intellectuals, the urban and rural proletariat (which had been neglected by politics in the
past), small and medium industrial and commercial entrepreneurs, and the rural middle
bourgeoisie.109 Studies indicate that Peronist support in 1946 was generally widespread and not
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strongly associated with any particular group.110 These figures and assessments showcase the diverse
background of Perón’s movement. In the Peronist coalition there were no adherences to political
loyalties traditionally associated with each of these groups (as understood through a binomial lens of
left and right). The mixing and melding of loyalties, goals, and pseudo-plans presented by Justicialismo
allowed Peronism to bypass the constrictions of either the left or the right. Having relied upon rightwing, military support to garner initial control of Argentinian political apparatus, Perón later realized
the untapped potential of the working class. Between 1946 and 1955 he incorporated urban
industrial workers into his power base but did so at the cost of alienating the business
establishment.111 This shift from right to center, and eventually left, represented a break-away from
the expected trajectory of political movements. The contradictory and shifting alliances additionally
point to another defining characteristic of Peronism: personalism. “The people” of Peronism was
created as a necessarily ambiguous label and applied to heterogenous social sectors. Perón’s success
was largely based on his ability to serve as an “articulator of heterogeneous forces over which he
established his personal control through a complicated system of alliances.”112 At the center of
political alliances and clashes stood Perón. His will was that of the people.
Much of Perón’s focus was on the working class. The Peronist’ economic model could be
considered as an emulation of the Scandinavian welfare states in a mixed economy with a central
role for unions in corporatist arrangements.113 He promoted the integration of workers into unions
(henceforth controlled by the Peronist state), increased the number of recipients of public social
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securities, and redistributed national income that benefitted the working class.114 Through Eva
Perón, his second wife, he rallied the support of women and in 1947, they were given the right to
vote. There is no denying that his policies originally led to the inclusion of previously neglected
sectors of society. However, it is critical to note that the methods operationalized for the sake of this
inclusion came with a hefty cost, and led to the erosion of democratic safeguards in Argentina—
which these groups later had to pay for in the 1980s. The authoritarian, and near-fascist, undertones
of Perón’s first two presidencies are undeniable, and are not bound by ideology. As a matter of fact,
the waning and shifting of Perón’s alliances showcase the movement’s refusal to remain static on
either side of the political spectrum as reforms were not ideologically-based but rather power-based,
and made on the whims of Perón.
In 1947, the Perón government began to move against free press channels. La Prensa and La
Nación (the two greatest papers in Argentina at the time) were sued for libel by the President for
carrying in their columns reports that critiqued him, and were under constant pressure from the
government (which controlled all supplies of newsprint and used its power to compel
subservience).115 La Prensa was shut down for its desire to remain independent from the statecontrolled propaganda machine while other news outlets came under seizure by the government. In
September of 1949, Peronist controlled Congress passed the law of disrespect which severely
penalized criticism of government officials by the press or by individuals.116 This gravely limited
channels of opposition and left little to no room for critique without severe consequence. During his
first and into his second presidency, Perón additionally attached Peronist ideology to constitutional
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reforms (1949) and injected Peronist teachings into school curriculums.117 Massive propaganda
campaigns in favor of his government were born during this time. The Peronist administration used
magazines, pamphlets, and posters which it displayed on the streets, in government buildings and
even in private homes, to create an entire universe of symbols surrounding the greatness of Perón
and Eva.118 In relation to constitutional arrangements, the changes accentuated the presidential
nature of the political system as the faculties of the Executive branch were increased and presidential
re-elections became possible.119 Moreover, the electoral college was abolished, inferior judges to the
Supreme Court removed, and education rights left up to the state as opposed to the provinces
(virtually limiting and reducing provincial power).120 All in all, democratic safeguards shrunk during
the first two Peronist periods. This had an array of consequences for those wishing to oppose his
rule as coalition building became more difficult.
Anti-Peronism: the first wave (1946-1955)
Peronism has never existed in a vacuum or its own separate pocket of time-space. Even
though Perón shared a wide range of support from across an array of socio-cultural and class
sectors, opposition to Peronism has materialized in the Argentinian political theater since the
movement’s inception. Anti-Peronism has changed, grown, and molded alongside Peronism.
Interrogating its history can showcase the Argentinian anti-populist movement’s chameleonic
nature, and the ways in which it bypasses the left right political spectrum. The challenger to Perón’s
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movement can be defined as “the political forces opposing Peronism-in-power.”121 This minimal
definition fits under the anti-populist label presented in Chapter Two in which anti-populism can be
understood as a discourse that posits itself in radical opposition to populism, creating an
antagonistic frontier between pro-populist and anti-populist forces.122
Just as the Peronist alliances included elements that cut across the ideological spectrum and
socio-cultural groups, anti-Peronism has been (and continues to be) a melting pot of ideologies and
groups. Despite the inclusive nature of the Peronist movement, many anti-fascist and pro-Allied (as
it relates to World War Two) coalitions—which had consolidated during the war period—
considered Perón to be the natural offspring of the anti-liberal military regime that had initially
brought him to power in 1943.123 As such, they believed his rise and policies to signal his
demagoguery and his desire to build an anti-democratic regime similar to those in Europe.124 In
response to Perón’s power consolidation, ideologically different groups came together. Due to this,
anti-Peronism was not bound by traditional party loyalties or alliances. The forces opposing Perón in
1946, calling themselves the Democratic Union, ranged from Communists and Socialists, to Radicales
(Radicals), to conservative business sectors.125 It additionally included the bulk of Unión Cívica Radical
(Radical Civic Union, UCR) and the conservative Argentine Industrial Union (Unión Industrial
Argentina, or UIA).126
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They all viewed Perón as a threat for their own set of reasons. Conservatives did not like
Perón’s corporatist economic policies or his encroaching on individual freedoms, while Communists
and Socialists considered him to be a fascist and associated him with Hitler and Mussolini. One of
the unifying factors or myths of the anti-Peronist coalition came to be liberalism as the group
believed Perón threatened the liberal order.127 Political conflict was thus framed as a clash between
an authoritarian type of government appealing to a culturally-localist form of nationalism, on the
one hand, and left-of-center political parties, students, and intellectuals asking for a liberaldemocratic form of non-authoritarian democratic rule on the other.128 In terms of left or right, the
overall anti-Peronist coalition, which attempted to defeat him in 1946 and continued to object his
government since, did not exclusively adhere to either side of the political spectrum.
Even though they sought to present a unified front before and after the presidential
elections, this conglomeration of parties ultimately failed to garner enough support to win. Perón
was elected as president twice (1946, 1952). There are a number of reasons for this reality.
Regardless of the fact that the ideologically diverse units of anti-Peronism considered themselves to
be defenders of democracy, they were ultimately plagued by a range of inconsistencies (in relation to
mass mobilization strategies) and internal divisions. Anti-Peronism during this time can and should
be labeled as elitist, as the Democratic Union rejected the working and lower classes and considered
them to be “ignorant masses deceived by a totalitarian leader or simple residues of barbarism.” 129 In
terms of divisions, many within the anti-Peronist movement could not agree on the levels of
acceptance of the liberal order as dictated by political debates in the aftermath of World War Two.
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Various pro-Allied sectors supported different elements of liberalism; for example, La Prensa
(conservative) argued for “individual freedom” and an “opposition to doctrines of individual
submission to the state” while Argentina Libre (radical, socialist, and progressive democrat) stated that
“saving fundamental individual freedoms, reconcile fertile liberalism with Socialist principles of
organization.”130 Tensions could also be found between Communists and Socialists, and among the
Catholic members of anti-Peronist groups. Orden Cristiano (liberal Catholic magazine), for instance,
sought to reconcile liberalism with Catholicism, a difficult project that led to constant tensions and
confrontations with the Catholic hierarchy.131 Ultimately, these clashes and contradictions (among
others), culminated into the coalition’s failure to win the national elections. Alliances were fraught
and fragile, and could not rely on the charismatic personalism of Peronism or the simplified model
of politics presented by populism.
Mobilization and coalition-building efforts were further complicated by the curtailing of civil
society by the Perón administration. Limitations were placed on dissident opinion during both of
Perón’s presidencies and the powers of the Executive extended to shrink the rights of other
branches within the Argentinian government. Schools and many newspapers were subjected to statemandated curriculums. Extreme political violence became normalized during this time period and
was encouraged by Perón himself. In 1953, the Socialist Casa del Pueblo was set on fire by followers
of Perón; this further fueled de-humanization campaigns employed by both Peronists and antiPeronists alike.132 Thus, the democratic spaces that had once been available for dissent and critique
grew smaller and smaller with each year of Peronist rule.
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As a result of this clear overstretching of power, former Peronist blocs turned against him.
By 1952, Perón started to make courses in Justicialismo compulsory in schools which triggered
backlash from the Catholic Church, an incredibly powerful force in Argentina.133 Over time Perón
gradually alienated businessmen, industrialists, and the Church—groups that had once been
instrumental in his gaining of power—which resulted in his ousting, and on the ultimate failure to
create a fully corporate state in Argentina. By mid-1955 the enlarged opposition was able to gather
force: a failed coup in June was followed in September by a limited insurrection that won the day
thanks to the passivity of the bulk of the army and the decisive support of the navy. 134 Anti-Peronist
groups relied on sectors that had previously supported Perón to oust him. Both Church and Army
had once aided the Perón administration, yet ultimately decided to turn against him. These alliances
with the anti-populist flank did not last long though and Perón’s exile did not dissipate his
supporters or popularity. Soon enough, Argentinian politics were once more overtaken by the nowestablished dichotomy of Peronism vs anti-Peronism.
Peronism without Perón: 1955-1974
Perón’s ousting did nothing to undo the shocks the Argentinian political system had already
undergone. Even while in exile, Perón and his legacy continued to affect trajectory of Argentinian
politics. During this time, the Peronist coalition developed within its ranks a “leftist” consciousness
and awareness. Many scholars have categorized this shift in rhetoric and practice as a response to the
exclusion of Peronism from political power and the continued attacks on the working class. 135
Peronism not only became fragmented and polarized as a result of Perón’s machinations, the
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Argentinian left gradually joined the Peronist front. Over time this division between more right-wing
elements of the movement and its newly acquired/developed leftist facets would spill over into
massive events of political violence.
In the aftermath of Peronist rule, those in power sought to create a stable political system
without Peronism. Their goal was to restore the hegemony of the “democratic” political parties
through the forced exclusion of Peronism.136 Despite these attempts to be a channel for democracy,
the immediate result of the 1955 coup was the creation of a provisional government dominated by
the armed forces; even though anti-Peronist parties could somewhat collaborate with the new
leaders, responsibility for policy rested with a military junta.137 The price for political stability came
with a somewhat temporary takeover by the armed forces and with the continual, and at times,
forceful removal of Peronism from the political sphere. The Peronist Party was dissolved while the
General Confederation of Labor (CGT) and the unions interdicted placed under the control of
officers of the armed forces.138 To guarantee a safe and relatively peaceful return to democracy
though, the head of the provisional military government, General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu,
eventually ceded power to a semi-democratic system. Even though Peronism was not allowed to
participate in the national elections as an official party, some anti-Peronist parties sought to secure
the Peronist vote. Peronism during this time essentially moved underground, surviving within trade
unions, clandestine cadre organizations, and thousands of neighborhood activist networks as the
party was banned and intermittently repressed throughout most of the 1955-1983 period.139 As a
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result of this change in power dynamics, Peronism itself experienced a range of ideological shifts
within its internal structure.
Arturo Frondizi emerged as President of the Unión Cívica Radical, in the aftermath of the
1958 elections; his party was a major opposer to Perón yet managed to secure a large following from
previous Peronist sectors such as unions.140 This altering in alliances was seen by many Peronists as a
betrayal to the movement and to their leader. As the dominant forces within the Peronist
leadership—specifically the trade union bureaucracy—moved towards agreement with the Frondizi
government and status quo conditions, the left labeled them as traitors and a strongly, definable ‘left’
current emerged.141 This added to growing tensions and further destabilized the political apparatus.
Besides this apparent cleavage in the movement’s ideological trajectory, divisions grew
between those Peronists who believed in “Peronism without Perón” and followers who sought to
take orders from the exiled president. Perón used his tactical skills to defend his leadership against
the Vandorist union leaders (who supported Metalworks Union figure, Augusto Vandor) and neoPeronist politicians who sought to move Peronism’s main locus of authority away from him and
toward a political party under their own hegemony.142 This proved to be a challenging endeavor as
Perón’s influence had poisoned the system and his own movement; the latter complicated attempts
by neo-Peronist’s to secure consistent support. In 1965-6, with the consolidation of the growing
Vandorist domination of Peronism—which was seen as conservative and rightist—the left emerged
from relative obscurity to join in a rival Peronist union organization (Organizaciones de Pie junto a
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Perón) to oppose the takeover by Vandor.143 This opposition was fueled by Perón’s refusal to
surrender power to neo-Peronist factions or leaders within the movement. He utilized the newly
obtained leftist support to prevent other leaders under the Peronist banner from gaining enough
votes to form a party or cohesive political movement. Whereas he had one relied on right-wing,
fascist rhetoric to mobilize his supporters, Perón learned to weaponize demands from the left and
promoted the backing of puppet leaders whose strings he ultimately managed. Peronism, within the
Perón/anti-Perón dichotomy that dominated the political and social context, was per se leftist, antiestablishment, and revolutionary, and loyalty to the exiled and vilified leader was enough of a
definition of a political strategy.144 Perón’s movement, the once-hailed inclusionary form of populist
politics—which I argue is a false cognate as populism is heavily contingent upon exclusion and
division—had turned on itself, becoming like the Ouroboros snake, forever bound by a cycle of
endless destruction and subsequent rebirth.
In the 1970s, against the backdrop of military regimes (1966-73), the Peronist front
continued to tear from within. Tensions were two-fold: existing on each side of the ideological
spectrum and inside Peronism itself. Augusto Vandor (often considered a center-right individual)
had been assassinated in 1969 by Peronist guerillas; his successor, Lorenzo Miguel was jailed by the
military during the 1970s.145 These events were accompanied by the official coming together of leftwing guerilla groups. The most important of these groups in terms of size and influence was
Montoneros—a strange fusion of far-right catholic nationalism and independent Marxism—which
utilized radical revolutionary language to mobilize working class sectors under the absolute
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leadership of Perón, and sought to reinstate him into power.146 This violent movement took direct
orders from Perón while in exile and ultimately secured his return. They engaged on a myriad of
politically violent endeavors including kidnappings and assassinations. The Montonero strategy was
defined as one of "popular war (leading to) the seizure of power and the construction of 'national'
socialism in which the three banners of Economic Independence, Social Justice and Political
Sovereignty would be made a reality.147 Thus, yet another seismic change within Peronism can be
observed: leftist consciousness eventually materializing into a disjointed quasi-leftist effort which
evolved into radical revolution backed by Marxist, Cuban revolution inspired, and most importantly
Peronist teachings. At the center of the change is Peronism’s ever-present North star: Perón himself.
Yet, even within the left-leaning wings of the Peronist movement, betrayal ran deep and true.
In 1973, Perón returned after 18 years of exile as a result of the Montoneros and Juventud
Peronista movements’ efforts to challenge the military regime in power. On September 23th 1973,
Perón was elected president for a third time with 62% of the vote.148 Despite these contributions
Perón condemned Montonero’s violent actions and broke any associations he had had with the guerilla
group in 1974. He directly denounced Montoneros and Juventud Peronista as “callow and stupid;” even
then, Montoneros refused to abandon their leader, believing Perón to be surrounded by right-wingers
alienating him from the people and the movement.149 Loyalty to their leader had defined the leftist
flanks of Peronism and these bonds were near-unbreakable. Even so, a gradual return to the less
radicalized, more center-right politics seemed imminent for Peronism with Perón back in power.
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On the other side of the Peronist ideological aisle grew right-wing paramilitary Peronist
groups such as La Guardia de Hierro (Iron Guard) and La Alianza Anticomunista Argentina (Triple A).
La Guardia de Hierro—born in the 1960s—were self-proclaimed enemies of Montoneros whom they
denounced as “Marxist infiltration,” and believed themselves to be orthodox Peronists. 150 Their
proposal was a total and prolonged war that implied defeating the historical enemies of Peronism:
the liberal bourgeoisie, imperialists, and those who embodied the historical personification of antiPeronism; they were not as concerned with the question of worker’s rights as other elements of
Peronism.151 This group combined the ultra-nationalist aspects of Peronism with fears of Marxist
infiltration of the political sphere. Triple A, on the other hand, was a parastatal death squad
responsible for the killing of many leftists in the 1970s.152 The anti-communist alliance sought to
eradicate the leftist sectors within and outside Peronism, and utilized political violence as its ultimate
weapon to fulfill that goal from 1973-1976.
The existence of the Triple A can be understood as an illegal and inhuman deal struck
between the federal government and Peronist fundamentalists who wished to see Perón regain and
maintain power. Triple A illegally used members of the Federal Police, members of the Presidential
guard and the Ministry of Welfare, as well as personnel from the State Intelligence Secretariat; the
group was responsible for hundreds of threat, attacks, and murders first against militants of the
Peronist left and later against all those who disturbed the established order. 153 This violent and more
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right-wing turn in Peronist politics showcases yet another change within the internal structure of the
Peronist movement.
These internal tensions eventually culminated in the continued normalization of violence as a
means of practicing politics. Some scholars on the subject have come to label the years of 1973-1976
as a period of Peronist civil war as members from paramilitary groups on both sides of the
ideological spectrum sought to exert their will over the Peronist movement.154 The desire for
domination over Peronism stemmed from different interpretations of what it meant to be a “true”
Peronist. After his death in 1974, Perón’s movement continued to engage in this definition-based
war across all fronts. Issues arose from the movement’s ever-changing definitional standards which
were dynamic and had morphed due to the internal and external conflicts delineated above. Since
the 1940s, the definition of Peronism has existed outside the boundaries of traditional movements
or parties. As a result, Peronist ranks suffered from constant and violent metamorphoses all across
the ideological spectrum. Even after his passing, Perón continued to haunt Argentina as the last
military junta sought to eradicate his legacy and wholly alter Argentinian society through despicable
means.
Anti-Peronism without Perón: 1955-1974
After his ousting in 1955, leaders and activists of the anti-Peronist movement recognized the
power that Peronism still exerted over Argentinian politics, and employed an array of different
tactics to ensure a return to Peronist politics was near-impossible, ranging from political violence
and the banning of Peronism from elections, to Peronist recruitment within their ranks. These
conflicts, debates and strategies existed within the confines of Argentina’s deteriorating political
infrastructure. The nation underwent military rule (1955- 8) indirect military rule, (1962-3), and
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direct intervention again (1966-73); military interventions were experienced in the first period to
overthrow Perón and to prepare the way for an acceptable non-Peronist government, and in the
second two cases interventions were made precisely to prevent the possibility of a return of
Peronism to power.155 Regardless of candidate, policy position, or proposed plans for society,
debates and political alliances were framed through this binary of Peronism and anti-Peronism as
opposed to traditional divides of left and right. Consequently, the overall anti-Peronist coalition
experienced a myriad of internal changes that constantly bypassed the ideological LR dichotomy.
Challenges in terms of coalition maintenance stemmed from the ultimate question presented by the
fall of Perón: what now for the Argentinian political system?
General Aramburu, who headed the provisional government from 1955 until 1958, fully
assumed responsibility to dismantle Peronism; some steps to undergo this endeavor nonexhaustively included the dissolving of the Peronist party, the abolishment of the 1949 Constitution,
and the forbidding of any kind of pro-Perón propaganda.156 Thus, the armed forces comprehensively
became an anti-Peronist body which sought to erase the former’s grip on the country and her
national consciousness. However, this hard-liner approach and the Army’s enforcement methods
created rifts within the anti-Peronist bloc. On the right, some old nationalists and “popular
conservatives” chose to align with Peronism while on the left, the government’s repressive policies
forced people to abandon the anti-Peronist bloc in which they had until then coexisted alongside
their natural enemies.157 The force with which the provisional government chose to utilize in
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approaching the Peronist question became counterproductive. It incited further fragmentation
within the anti-Peronist movement and pushed many non-Peronist actors into Perón’s waiting arms.
With the Peronist dictatorship gone, the UCR (Unión Cívica Radical or Radical Civic Union)
once again became the nation’s strongest political force.158 Moreover, the military government’s
banning of Peronism as a party meant that the Radicals faced little to no opposition within the
political theater. Even so, the UCR continued to be incredibly divided which complicated
consolidation efforts. In 1957, Alberto Frondizi’s nomination for presidency (1956) led to a major
spilt within the party; this division between newly formed Unión Civíca Radical Intransigente (proFrondizi, UCRI) and Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo (conservative wing, anti-Frondizi, pro Ricardo
Balbín, UCRP) represented the diverging views regarding the Peronist issue as well as differences in
terms of group alliances and their base of representation.159 Frondizi, an avid critic of the provisional
military regime, a left-leaning progressive capitalist, and someone who sought to secure Peronist
support, campaigned throughout 1957 and 1958. He appealed to the working class and aimed to
include former Peronist supporters into his movement. However, his refusal to completely ostracize
Peronist voters led to discontent within the anti-Peronist bloc. Yet despite these growing tensions,
UCRI obtained around 70 percent of the electoral votes.160 UCRI’s reliance on the Peronist vote
would lead to further polarization within its ranks.
Fragmentation continued to plague the anti-Peronist movement throughout the 1960s. Late
in 1960, each of the existing Radical Parties split again as the UCRI moved to the right in the
ideological spectrum; this led to the creation of Movemiento Nacional y Popular (leftist, MNP) and Unión
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Cívica (leftist splinter within UCRI).161 Frondizi became an even more controversial figure inside the
anti-Peronist bloc throughout his presidency as he allowed for further Peronist access into the
political theater. On March 1962, shortly before the congressional elections, the President
announced that Peronists would be allowed to run for all public offices under the label of some of
the neo-Peronists parties; Frondizi’s actions angered the armed forces, led to his deposing, and the
return to indirect military rule in the country. 162 The fracturing and displacement inside the Radical’s
ranks was accompanied by more cracks spreading in the anti-Peronist foundation. In 1963, the
UCRI itself divided as the bulk of the party backed progressive Buenos Aires governor Oscar
Alende, transforming the UCRI into a left of center party; the rest of the party, led by Frondizi,
formed the Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo (Movement of Integration and Development or
MID), which shifted to the right, appealed to nationalist industrialists, and eventually became an ally
of the Peronists.163 Despite the viable—albeit, at times, undemocratic—channels available for
Radicalism to gain and maintain power, anti-Peronist movements failed to quell their own internal
tensions, which left the bloc vulnerable to external pressures. Even so, 1963 saw the return of postPeronism and post-military rule until 1966. Arturo Illía, a centrist UCR candidate, governed from
1963-66. His presidency was punctuated by economic crises, a respect for democratic procedures, a
resolve to not abuse presidential powers, and a desire not to exacerbate conflicts, in the hope that
these would be resolved in time.164 Despite these attempts at quelling conflicts, more in Argentina
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became disillusioned with democracy’s inefficiencies, and agreed with the military’s attempt to
establish order.
As a result, the armed forces took over the Argentinian political apparatus once more in
1966. General Juan Carlos Onganía led a military coup that toppled the civilian government of
President Arturo Illía; the military attempted to maintain power indefinitely and led a restoration of a
“Christian sense of family.”165 Anti-communist rhetoric plagued the regime and eventually led to the
targeted repression of academic centers.166 Universities were seen as points of genesis for communist
rhetoric and as such were subjected to bans and censorship campaigns. Even though support for
this military takeover came from a diverse range of channels—including Perón himself—Radicals,
Socialists and Communists stood in staunch opposition to the usurpation. 167 Yet it was not their
forces that ultimately overthrew the military regime but rather Peronist and left-wing guerilla groups
like Montoneros.
Popular mobilization was increasingly being identified with Peronism and with Perón; the
Radicals and other anti-Peronist elements remained in the sidelines for much of this time as former
anti-Peronist sectors (such as the upper middle class) began to see his return as a promise for
peace.168 Perón’s influence continued to grow during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the ongoing
violence incited by the military created an environment where the Argentinian people reverently
wished for a return to normalcy and balance. As a result of the armed forces’ approach to political
repression and violence, unprecedent cooperation between the Peronist and anti-Peronist took
place. In 1970, the Peronists and Radicals signed a pact, La Hora del Pueblo, whereby they reversed
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the antagonism that had made them irreconcilable opponents since the mid-1940s.169 The agreement
meant that neither party would participate in a coming election if any of them was proscribed, and
both would support the resulting constitutional regime, irrespective of the winner.170 This level of
agreement between the two sides of the dichotomy represented a temporary change in Argentinian
party politics wherein co-existence appeared to be a possibility, one that never fully materialized.
Most of the internal factions of Peronism gave only lip service to support Perón’s initiative;
ultimately, despite their ideological differences, the Montonero guerillas, the union leadership, and the
fascistic palace clique which surrounded Perón and his wife upon his return, all coincided in their
hostility toward the establishment of a party-dominated political system.171 As a result of his refusal
to relinquish power and control, Perón managed to secure a large portion of the votes in 1973. La
Hora del Pueblo represented a fleeting moment of collaboration and partnership between antiPeronists and Peronists which did not hold for long. In the face of a larger threat to the survival of
Argentina’s political apparatus—the armed forces—factions from across the Peronist-centered
divide managed to come together. Although these moments are rare and few in between, their
existence points to the complexity of alliances within and outside both Peronism and anti-Peronism.
Conclusion
Argentina’s political reality does not fit the traditional frameworks utilized to understand
politics in a comparative or global sense. The historiography of both Peronism and anti-Peronism
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since the 1940s until 1974 demonstrates the numerous ruptures and ideological shifts both
movements have experienced, and even points to rare cases of cooperation between the two sides.
Argentina’s complex and intricate political history is an example of the drastic changes a political
culture undergoes once populist movements become injected into mainstream political theaters. The
entire Argentinian culture accommodated and molded itself around the new political identities born
in 1946. Parties and ideologies across the political spectrum fused together and tore themselves apart
both within and outside Peronism.
The Peronist base is not bound by ideology but by an allusion to Perón and power, to the
glory of the past. It is not ideologically-based as elements from both the extreme right and left have
co-existed alongside each other inside the Peronist umbrella. Peronism is a discursive frame that has
evolved over time; at the center of its narrative creation lies Perón and the ever-present battle of “us
vs. them.” This is demonstrated by the constant ideological shifts and ruptures that the Peronist bloc
underwent since its inception in 1943 until 1974. Peronism is not static and should rather be
understood as a dynamic force that moves all across the ideological spectrum. The same reality can
be seen in the anti-Peronist movement.
Argentinian politics are a matter of constant negotiation across the political spectrum, and
are ultimately dictated by the Peronist and anti-Peronist divide. It is critical to remember that these
political allegiances are not permanent though, as showcased by the Church’s and Army’s change in
attitude towards Perón which ultimately led to his ousting, or Frondizi’s eventual shift to Peronism.
However, despite these alterations in party association, intra-cleavage alliances are much more
common than inter-cleavage ones (e.g. it is less likely for cooperation or party switching to happen
across the Peronist/anti-Peronist divide as sociocultural differences between the groups is too big to
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bridge the gap).172 The left and right of Peronism are not like the left and right of Anti-Peronism. As
such, they will continue to battle for dominance within their own ranks and outside of them after
Argentina’s return to democracy in 1983.
How can anyone truly label Argentina as a country of either explicitly the left or right? Such
titles do not capture the sheer complexity that exists within the networks and alliances which make
up the Argentinian political realm. Neither Peronism nor anti-Peronism are defined in left-right
terms; the two sides cannot be ordered, by analysts or scholars, as left or right of one another, as can
be done for example with (most of) the Democratic Party and the Republican Party in the U.S.173
The Peronist-centered dichotomy ultimately controls Argentinian politics and establishes the lines
political and non-political actors alike have to navigate. The following chapter explores the more
contemporaneous consequences of this reality from 1983 up until 2019.
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Chapter Four: Contemporary Peronism
The Argentinian political theater continued to be defined along lines demarcated by the
Peronist/anti-Peronist divide even in the aftermath of the nation’s last military junta. After Perón’s
presidential victory in 1973, his subsequent death in 1974, and his wife Isabel Perón’s ousting by the
military, Argentina experienced one of the most brutal dictatorships in Latin American history.
Perón passed on July 1, 1974, and was succeeded by his then vice-president and wife Isabel; under
her rule, terrorism worsened, divisions festered, and the economy suffered.174 These conditions
created an environment ripe for military takeover as the Argentine people craved law and order
above all and hoped for a return to stable governance. It has been commonplace in Argentina for
the military to assume control once a civilian government has been deemed unfit to rule. As a result,
when the armed forces ousted Isabel and invaded the Argentinian political apparatus, there was “a
national sigh of relief.”175
The military junta initially presented itself as a reformist machine hoping to fix Argentina.
These reforms quickly morphed into non-target specific state violence “justified” under the guise of
snuffing out subversion. The junta turned disappearances into a government policy and in doing so
gave new meaning to the concept of state terrorism.176 From the years 1974-1983, Argentinians all
across the board and the political spectrum underwent brutal repression and violent disappearances.
This period of time wholly altered the Argentinian national consciousnesses as an estimated 30,000
people were killed or forcefully disappeared.177 Spaces for political participation were virtually
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destroyed and the nation became a husk of what it once had been as every dimension of life
corroded under the junta’s touch.
Argentina’s democracy was swallowed whole by a fearmongering, power-hungry military
government that propagated its own demise. In 1983, however, free and fair elections were
reinstituted which allowed for political parties to launch fierce campaigns against the regime. Once
the election campaigns started, the crucial competition was between Peronists and Radicals.178
Political clashes were once more made on the Peronist and anti-Peronist arena. This has been the
nucleus of Argentinian politics since the 1940s and continues to be the main definer of political
allegiances in the status quo. Since the country’s return to democracy, the Peronist front has
experienced a series of deep-seated alterations; similar metamorphoses can be studied in the antiPeronist bloc. The constant shifts and ever-changing nature of political alliances in the Argentinian
political theater has created a reality where labels of left and right are rendered useless in the realm
of political analysis. Even though “left” and “right” carry normative standards that Argentinians
utilize to create political identities, these are firstly and inherently born as a result of the Peronist and
anti-Peronist divide. Elements of both the extreme left and right have existed within and outside
both movements; neither is exclusively limited to either side of the left-right ideological dichotomy.
The following chapter focuses on this reality and on the changes the antithetical relationship
between Peronism and its main challengers have experienced since Argentina’s return to democracy.
Argentina’s re-democratization process
During the military junta’s reign Argentina’s democratic political apparatus was cracked open,
violated, and ultimately left to bleed out. Thus, in the aftermath of the armed forces’ ousting, the
nation had to embark on a journey to mend itself back together. Argentinians had to pick from the
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gore and ruin that plagued every dimension of life and establish a skeleton framework upon which
to let democracy stand. This near-impossible endeavor was marked by a re-institution of political
participation through free and fair elections. The consequential mobilization defined whether or not
parties could gain power as Argentina’s return to democracy led to the re-structuring of party
hierarchies and alliances. The entire system had been destroyed; leaders, therefore, navigated the
wreckage and chose allies on the basis of electoral survival. Parties all across the ideological
spectrum had suffered under the military regime, none had been spared. This presented an
opportunity for Argentinians to break away from the ever-dominating political divide of Peronism
and anti-Peronism. Yet, the chance passed and soon enough politics continued to be defined by the
antagonist relationship between the Peronist and anti-Peronist bloc.
Within Argentina’s newly re-born democratic project, two parties became the sole viable
electoral options in the system: Radicalismo (Radicalism, UCR) and Justicialismo (Peronism, PJ). The
latter were the only factions inside the political theater that managed to adapt and garner enough
support to mobilize voters. Marxist/Socialists parties such as the new Trotskyite Movement to
Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS) achieved limited success in the 1980s; while national rightwing parties like Carapintadas (Painted Faces) positioned themselves as “anti-populist” and enjoyed
the finite backing of the business community but were not popular enough.179 Parties that were
exclusively of the right or the left did not attain the necessary levels of influence and mobilization to
survive the nation’s tumultuous return to democracy. As such, more extreme elements of both
progressivism and conservatism were confined to the margins of the political theater or were
adopted under the Peronist and/or anti-Peronist umbrella.
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Peronism, on the other hand, melded itself and adopted new hierarchal structures to be
accepted as a legitimate pro-democracy party. The old movement, accompanied by its authoritarianesque past and tense relationship with democracy, abandoned the feature that had marked its initial
existence: a rigid hierarchy and unquestioning loyalty to one’s superiors.180 Radicalism additionally
underwent changes of its own. The movement experienced a renewal due to the initiatives of Raúl
Alfonsín. A modernizer and reformer, Alfonsín challenged the leadership of Radical leader Ricardo
Balbín as Balbín’s decision to reconcile with Perón during the Hora del Pueblo agreement of 1970
pushed the presidential candidate and younger party members to seek reform within the antiPeronist ranks of the UCR; these changes manifested in the creation of the Movimiento Renovador
Nacional (National Renewal Movement, MRN).181 Alfonsín disapproval of his party’s trajectory led to
the creation of more left-leaning spaces. The MNR summoned the most progressive sectors of the
UCR and allowed them to compete internally against the party’s conservative side, headed by
Balbín.182 During 1972 and beyond Alfonsín’s presidency (which began in 1983), the UCR housed
traditional and progressive elements, which competed with one another to gain control over the
party. This level of coexistence between different sides of the traditionally conceptualized ideological
spectrum points to the heterogeneity of viewpoints to be found within the UCR—and Argentinian
political parties in general. The diversity inside anti-Peronist parties who could compete against
Peronism continued to shift and ultimately reached a complex convergence point during the
Alliance between UCR and FREPASO (Frente País Solidario, Front for a Country in Solidarity) in the
1990s.
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In 1983, most observers anticipated a Peronist electoral victory.183 Historical precedence, its
high levels of popular support, and the movement’s dependence on the myth of Perón gave the
Peronists a plethora of advantages. Many additionally believed that union strength—which had
guaranteed Peronism’s success in the past—would ensure the Peronist contender’s victory. In a
surprising turn of events, however, and in spite of these predications, Raúl Alfonsín won the
presidential elections. A Radical intellectual and member of the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR/Radicals),
Alfonsín handed the Peronists their first defeat in a free election.184 His administration focused
heavily on re-building Argentina’s democracy, strengthening the rule of law, and on addressing the
horrifying human rights abuses that had been carried out by junta. Alfonsín’s Radicals adopted many
of the left’s proposals, pushed for a return to academic life, and encouraged the reentrance of
intellectuals into the political arena.185 His style and candor represented a juncture in traditional
Radical thought as more progressive ideas were adopted during his time in office.
The anti-populist rhetoric communicated by the Alfonsín government—both implicitly and
explicitly—rested upon rebuilding Argentina’s destroyed democratic apparatus. Thus, the main and
strongest faction of the anti-Peronist front in the 1980s stood as a strong defender of democratic
institutions. Ideas, plans, and policies expressed and promoted by Alfonsín and his allies underlined
the importance of protecting neoliberal democracy. Their methods of political communication and
alliance-building aligns with the definitions of anti-populism presented in Chapter Two. Antipopulist blocs are contingent upon a hostile attitude towards populism, a desire to defend
established norms and institutions, and a movement makeup that is inherently ideologically diverse
(as the anti-populist group is built in temporary alliances of opposition to populism).
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Yet, even though Radicalism experienced high levels of support in the mid-1980s, the
euphoric return to civilian governance eventually waned into commonplace skepticism for the
constant failures that plagued the political system. The Argentinian democratic project remained
shrouded in shadows as the UCR and Peronism realigned themselves against the backdrop of
skyrocketing inflation and an ever-worsening economic crisis. Rebuilding democratic infrastructure
was not an easy endeavor and the populist power resurgence under Carlos Menem—after a
restructuring of the internal hierarchy of Peronism itself—led to the establishment of a damaging
cycle of democratic institutional erosion, further alienating Argentinians from the political realm.
Peronism and democracy: a fluid paradox
Between 1989 and 1995, the UCR went through a steady period of electoral failure as
Peronism consistently defeated it in five straight national elections: two presidential, two mid-term,
and one constituent ballot.186 These losses were multicausal and stemmed from an array of sources.
On the one hand, the nation continued to sink under the weight of a) the burden of rebuilding an
entire democratic system and b) the growing economic crisis. On the other, the Peronist
movement’s restructuring led to an absolute ideological shift unlike ones previously discussed in this
project. The Peronist front underwent a series of rapid and shocking changes that ultimately altered
the party’s foundation, their policy proposals, and the ways in which union leaders (the backbone of
the Peronist movement) interacted with the PJ.
Populist movements are volatile and do not adhere to the traditional confines inherently
found in both ideology or history. Even when a populist bloc has decades of historical
alliances/commitments with certain societal factions, both internal and external conditions can result
in a complete rearrangement of the relationship between leader and their constituents. This is
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because “the people” of populism are an invention, a collective phantasmagorical subject; the point
of convergence for Peronist leaders has always been and continues to be their belief that they act in
the name of the people, and in doing so they nurture an almost limitless audacity to modify the
itinerary of their policies.187 The empty signifier of “the people” is highly malleable and can be
modified on the whims of a movement’s leadership. Legitimized populism additionally leads to the
creation of a new social contract between leader and demos, one wherein the former can bypass
previously-made movement promises, the left-right ideological spectrum, and democratic
institutions. This reality can be seen in the rise to power of Peronist President Carlos Menem.
Radicalism’s electoral victories in 1983 and 1985 injected mounting pressure into a
scrambling Peronist movement. What had once been a unified front buckled under the strain of
defeat and as a such, fractures became an ever-accelerated threat to the survival of Peronist thought.
The center of Peronist identity from 1945 and 1989 had been heavily linked to class-based struggle
and relied on a rigid hierarchy of power. Even though Peronist alliances adapted greatly after
Perón’s ousting—and later his death—Peronism before Menem was marked by a series of a
common themes. In the pre-Menem world, there were a number of key elements within the Peronist
core including: representation of the poor and the workers, a strong defense of the corporatist social
order in which unions and the military played a central role in the political and economic arena, an
abrasion to the international order, and the exclusion of its “enemies.”188 A tendency to cut across
either the left and right may have been common for Peronism, however, a deviation from these
generally-accepted components was not. Beginning in 1983, Peronism underwent a far-reaching
process of de-unionization as reformers dismantled Peronism’s mechanisms of labor participation,
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and clientelist networks gradually replaced the party’s union-based linkages to the working and lower
classes.189 These changes began to become evident in 1987, when the Renovadores (Renovators), a
group led by Antonio Cafiero (which included Menem) realized the growing need to modernize
Peronism.190 The group focused on reforming the Peronist party, PJ, and make it more compatible
with democracy.
Reforms were meant to distance the movement from its authoritarian past and tendencies.
The hierarchical structure of the Peronism, wherein decision-making was highly centralized and
defined primarily by the leader, chafed with the pluralist propensities of democracy. Many thus
believed that Peronism had to become a legitimate party, yet those in Renovadores leadership positions
had a burden of proof that proved too heavy for many. Those wanting to renovate Peronism needed
to a) show that they were the real Peronists after the death of Perón and b) demonstrate they were
not completely breaking with Peronist tradition while simultaneously changing the movement’s
makeup.191 A fissure arose from disagreements in relation to how to achieve the aforementioned
goals. Carlos Menem, a member of the group, defended the unity of Peronism, including the
authoritarian old guard, while Antonio Cafiero—the Renovadores leader—argued that formal unity
with those sections was worthless; thus, Menem became Cafiero’s main opponent within
Peronism.192
As the presidential elections approached, Menem sought to posit himself as a “true”
representative of the people. In order to do so, Menem fully embraced the populist discursive frame
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for performing politics. He combined violent groups from the Peronist right and left, orthodox
Peronists, and all the “leftover” electoral players from which Cafiero did not approve. 193 His was an
“antielite” group that provided him with a diverse electorate, including trade-union leaders spurned
by Cafiero and local political bosses displaced by the Renovadores, as he promised a return to the
paradise of the welfare state through a salariazo. 194 He even managed to pull support from the antiPeronist flank as well. The Carapintadas (which had previously presented itself as an anti-populist
group) became part of Menem’s vast electoral campaign coalition and even offered to take up arms
to defend a Menem Peronist victory at the polls in 1989.195 Menem’s ascension within Peronism not
only represented the further fracturing of the traditional coalition, but additionally characterized the
movement’s sharp turn to the right of the ideological spectrum.
As a candidate, he lost votes to the left (mainly FREPASO) while he gained the support of
more rightist factions of Radicalism.196 Additionally, beginning in 1983, union power and influence
over the Peronist bloc weakened as they were actively pushed to the margins. This marginalization
stemmed from the belief that a Peronism thoroughly subordinated to union leaders would be unable
to attract many votes from outside the working class; subsequently, when Peronism split, both
Cafiero and Menem represented the non-union sector of the Peronist movement.197 Peronist
rhetoric had evolved, further demonstrating the movement’s lack of attachment to an ideological
base. Once in office, Menem put these ideas into practice, walked back many of his election
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promises, and instituted a neoliberal agenda that turned unions into mere shadows of what they had
once been.
Carlos Menem defeated Cafiero during Peronist internal elections and in 1989, secured a
victory against the Radical presidential candidate. Once in office, Menem decisively ventured away
from the Peronist creed. As president, he divided the labor movement and promoted a neoliberal
economic agenda based on the tenets of the Washington Consensus.198 Menem’s political objectives
centered around stabilizing the economy and mitigating the damage caused by inflation. The PJ
under Menem became a meld of liberal-conservativism; the party promoted privatization and
deregulation, weakened its alliance with the unions, and sought new support in the national centerright parties, the armed forces and the conservative sectors of the Catholic Church.199 As previously
established, in the pre-Menem era, Peronism adhered to a set of key principles surrounding the role
of the leader and state in regards to the economy. These tenets became flexible under “Menenism”
as Menem diversified the Peronist electorate while marginalizing the movement’s once-strongest
supporter and becoming a close ally of the United States. Menem’s strain of Peronism sought a
political consensus in an alliance of competitive capitalists (this time agrarian as well as industrial),
with the poorest sectors of the urban population, and the multi-class clientelistic bases in marginal
provinces.200 This conglomeration of contradicting elements was only possible due to Peronism’s
chameleonic nature; as a discursive frame of politics, Peronism could essentially move on a
trajectory of its creation, as long as it alluded to the myth of Perón, housed a charismatic leader,
romanticized the past, and promoted nationalism on some level or another.
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Even though the economy managed to gain steady footing during Menem’s years in office,
democratic institutions suffered greatly. In this regard, he did remain faithful to the Peronist
tradition, as he either neglected institutions or sought to manipulate them in pursuit of his central
goal: to remain in power.201 Damaging institutional strength came in the form of court-packing and
constitutional reforms. The aforementioned two were connected as court-packing would
theoretically enable Menem to rewrite the constitutional limits on reelections if he managed to
acquire enough popular support. In 1990, he had obtained legislation to increase the size of the
Supreme Court from five to nine, and due to a number of resignations he had been able to fill six of
the nine places on the Court.202 Following traditional populist thought, Menem presented himself as
the physical manifestation of “the people’s” will and therefore did not care for checks and balances
or the separation of powers needed for democracies to function. In the end, his political
machinations backfired as a result of internal tensions and conflicts within Peronism. Governor
Eduardo Duhalde, a Peronist who sought the presidential nomination among other Peronists, felt
compelled to seek a popular referendum to prevent Menem from seeking a third term; they did so as
they did not believe in the Court’s ability to uphold the Constitution.203 Menem’s defeat did not
come as a direct result of the damage to the former Peronist base (unions and the working class) but
rather as a consequence of inner movement clashes.
Peronism had changed drastically under Menem’s two terms as president. The movement
fractured on the issue of party reform and as a result moved to the right of the ideological spectrum.
Menem’s promises during the campaign trail focused on a return to Argentina’s welfare state,
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increasing worker wages, and stabilizing the economy. Yet, once in office, Peronism underwent
shocking metamorphoses as unions became further marginalized and Menem welcomed elements of
the Peronist old guard such the extreme right, the Army, and the Church. And even though
Menem’s neoliberal policies and alliances with big businesses (and other historical enemies of
Peronism) were predicted to lead to a decrease in traditional lower-class support, Peronism managed
to retain that electorate faction.204 Although this may seem contradictory, it is critical to remember
that as a frame of politics—and not an ideology—Peronism appeals to its voters through a
challenging of institutions, norms, and the decorum expected in politics. Understood as a “frame,”
populism encompasses every aspect that affects political voter calculation including socio-cultural
dimensions. The key to Menem’s electoral support among the lower-strata of society was his
capacity to remain “Peronist.”205 Framing politics as the continuation and maintenance of Peronism
guaranteed his victories. However, growing internal divisions within the Peronist flank left the
movement in disarray and in 1999, the UCR won the Argentinian presidential elections.

La Alianza
During the Menem years, Radicalism managed to find new methods to survive its party
fraying, mostly through power-bargaining and alliance-making within the anti-Peronist bloc.
Beginning in 1995, the UCR and FREPASO, two anti-Peronist parties, began coordinating the terms
of formal alliance despite their differences. The nucleus of FREPASO came from a left-of-center
group that had split off from Peronism in 1991 (the Group of Eight) which later turned into Frente
Grande (FG), a vocal critic of Menem; FG—which would eventually become FREPASO—based its
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appeal on republicanism and political liberalism, that is, respect for the division of powers, judicial
independence, and clean government.206 Due to these values, FREPASO aligned well with UCR.
Upon realizing the parties’ potential for electoral success once they combined their efforts, UCR and
FREPASO created a unified front against PJ in the form of a coalition labeled Alianza (Alliance).
Party calculations for the alliance were made along the lines demarcated by the Peronist and antiPeronist divide, as opposed to the left/right dichotomy. Although UCR and FREPASO shared a
propensity toward the left side of the ideological spectrum, the goals that united the two centered
around defeating the Peronist movement and ensuring their own party’s survival. In this case,
Alianza fits under the definition of anti-populism presented in Chapter Two as it is a “mix of
ideological and strategic bedfellows pulled together in a temporary alliance of opposition to
populism.207 The anti-Peronist coalition gave space to rhetoric, ideas, and societal elements that
sought to postulate themselves in radical opposition to Menem’s populism.
Under Menem, the progressive middle classes had been left out and it was among them that
Alianza found its constituency.208 Those wishing to protect democratic institutions viewed Menem as
an aberration of the political system, as a demagogue who had debilitated a near-nonexistent
democratic apparatus. One of Menem’s most pointed legacies was a marked decline in public trust
and political institutions, as a lack of transparency, a series of corruption scandals, and his courtpacking schemes created a perception of widespread abuses of power.209 Alianza provided those
discontented voters with an alternative to the status quo, one that promised a respect for democracy
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and a strong dose of social equality in order to correct the sharp inequalities occasioned by the
neoliberal economic regime.210 Governing with Peronism as the opposing force has never been an
easy endeavor. During the Alianza government’s years in power (1999-2001), after the victory of
presidential election and UCR member Fernando de la Rúa in 1999, the Peronists became a violent
thorn at democracy’s side. The Peronists enjoyed a sizable representation in Argentina’s chamber of
deputies, where Alianza held a bare majority, and above all controlled the Senate.211 As a result, the
Peronists who had managed to siphon a bit of control over the system, exercised a highly
obstructionist policy. Yet it was not the schemes of Peronism that sealed the coffin of the Alianza
government but the economy.
The anti-Peronist alliance had inherited an economy teetering on the edge of a precipice and
struggled to find a feasible plan to prevent it from crashing. To make matter worse, the economic
and political ideas of De la Rúa were contrary to those of the majority of the UCR party structure.
While the president was a worshiper of conservative thought and neoliberal ideology, Alfonsín and
other important radicals were prone to Keynesianism, state intervention and the protection of the
internal markets, which often led to tensions within the party.212 While in power, Alianza
continuously cut across the ideological spectrum in order to reach agreements inside its own ranks.
This level of party inner-negotiation and compromise resulted in a bypassing of the traditional left
and right. Moving beyond the left-right dichotomy was accepted as a valid method of practicing
politics, and not seen as ideological betrayal if it meant defeating Peronism. However, despite the
appeal of the Alianza’s plans, this conglomeration of anti-Peronist interests did not manage to stay in
power for long as a perpetual recession sunk its claws into the nation.
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Peronism and Crisis
In 2001, the Argentinian economy collapsed on itself. This vicious crash, which had been
threatening the survival de la Rúa administration, led to fatal unrest and the eventual resignation of
the president and his cabinet. In the coming months, Argentina underwent serial handovers of
executive power—including three different interim presidents—that ensued until a special session of
Congress in 2002, which chose leading Peronist senator Eduardo Duhalde to take office for two
years.213 The economic crisis continued under his leadership and growing levels of instability pushed
the nation’s democracy to the verge of absolute collapse. Extensive public hostility toward the
political elite raised the specter of full-scale party-system collapse and the rise of an antiestablishment outsider.214 These conditions created ripe ground for the continued perpetuation of
populist rule. As mentioned in Chapter One, crisis is both an internal and external condition of
populist rule.
However, this would only be possible if the PJ managed to get its affairs in order. The party
itself lay in near-shambles, divided between Menem and Duhalde who fought to maintain control
over the movement. After years of bitter rivalry and desperate for a candidate to defeat Menem,
Duhalde turned to Néstor Kirchner, a little-known governor who had been one of the few Peronists
to oppose Menem throughout the 1990s; once accepted as a nominee (along Menem and ex-interim
president Adolfo Rodríguez Saá), Kirchner positioned himself as a modern progressive, adopting a
center-left “neo-Keynesian” platform.215 Within the PJ ticket, Menem, Kirchner and Rodríguez Saá
represented different and contradicting sides of the left-right ideological spectrum yet operated
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under the same Peronist umbrella. Menem personified the right and continued to promote his freemarket, neoliberal reforms, while Rodríguez Saá cast himself a traditional Peronist with a national
and populist appeal.216 Despite the PJ’s history of incorporating a wide range of ideological
viewpoints and managing to present a unified electoral front, this was the first time since its creation
that the Peronist party contested the general elections divided.217 The unusual and paradoxical level
of competition within this party front underscores the general hypothesis of this thesis project:
Peronism is not ideologically bound, but rather bound by an allusion to and desire for power. There
are no contractual promises to either the right or the left within Peronism. Even as the movement
deviated to the left under Kirchner, this truth continued to mark the Peronist flanks.
The Radicals experienced similar levels of disarray. De la Rúa’s depressing performance left
the UCR in an extremely debilitated state and fostered the flight from its ranks of two relevant
figures: former minister Ricardo López Murphy and congresswoman Elisa Carrió, both of whom
created new political formations to run for the presidency.218 Neither won the election, yet their
retreat from Radicalism smeared the UCR beyond repair as the party’s own candidate performed
poorly during his campaign. The electoral defeat punctured the UCR’s last functioning lung and
forced it to withdraw into the shadows, gasping for air, longing for a return to what it once had
been.
All in all, the 2003 elections cracked open Argentina’s political culture and forced it to
reassemble. Since the 1940s, the political scene had been dominated by the Radical-Peronist
twosome; this ultimately shattered as a result of the Radical party’s effective dissolution at the
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national level and the emergence of a polarized multi-party system.219 Yet, despite these shocking
and deep-seated changes, political clashes continued to be made on the Peronist/anti-Peronist arena.
Political calculations—in relation to both leader strategies and voter identity formation—were first
and foremost defined by people’s relationship to populism and anti-populism.
From Kirchner to Kirchner: kirchnerismo
Under the Kirchner regime—which lasted twelve years—Peronism evolved once more and
came to be known as kirchnerismo. From his inauguration in 2003 onwards, Kirchner embarked on a
campaign to create a new Peronist identity, once which drew upon the myth of Perón to garner and
maintain popular support. This strain of Peronism was further sensationalized after his passing in
2010, and continued to grow under the leadership of his wife Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.
Claudio Katz, Argentinian author and professor of economics at the University of Buenos Aires,
outlined three key components that make up kirchnerismo:
1. The reconstruction of a capitalist State.
2. A neo-populist regime.
3. A government of the center-left.220
Kirchner’s goal was to restructure the expectations of the Argentinian populace in relation to
the role of the state, which had changed drastically under the Menem presidency. From the
beginning of his mandate, he sought to articulate a "transversal" movement that included
progressive or center-left forces, thus widening the margins of the alliance with the PJ's Duhalde
apparatus.221 Internal fractures had had devastating impacts on the Peronist flank during the
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elections. Consequently, Kirchner attempted to bypass one of Peronism’s original sins: its insatiable
desire for power. The hierarchy of the movement itself had been created to ensure constant and
unquestionable centralization of executive power. This consolidation oftentimes grated against the
interests of other powerful factions within the Peronist bloc. As seen throughout this histography,
when in government, Peronism tends to behave as a political regime all by itself: thus, government
and opposition coexist within the PJ.222 Even though he had managed to secure a wide range of
support during the 2003 elections, competition between two different camps of Peronism came to
head in 2005. Néstor Kirchner's proxy victory over Eduardo Duhalde (as Kirchner’s wife had
defeated Duhalde’s during the senatorial elections) cemented his absolute control over the Justicialist
Party throughout the country, and by extension over the Argentine political system given the large
majorities held by the party in the national Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.223 This level of
contradictory and tense internal competition within Peronism and anti-Peronism had severe
consequences for the country as it complicated the anti-Peronist bloc’s ability to mobilize
successfully.
Peronism’s near-absolute control of the Argentinian political apparatus continued to
manifest itself in 2007. Since their defeat in 2003, anti-Peronist factions stayed fragmented and
scattered all across the ideological spectrum. Subsequently, they did not manage to amass enough
votes to defeat Kirchner’s wife Cristina. Kirchner’s presidential victory was, in part, due to the
opposition’s weakness. The UCR had been grossly debilitated and under Néstor, five of the UCR’s
six governors and more than a third of its 476 rejected the Radical leadership and instead backed the
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government, earning the label “K Radicals.”224 Traditional party betrayal of this magnitude should be
noted for two different reasons: the latter 1) further incapacitated the anti-Peronist movement and
2) demonstrated the tenuous nature of alliances made on the basis of the Peronist/anti-Peronist
divide. In the aftermath of the 2007 elections, anti-populist forces continued to fracture.
Cristina de Kirchner’s two presidencies nearly destroyed the JP and corroded Argentina’s
democratic institutions. The Kirchners’ own political grouping, the Frente para la Victoria (FPV, the
Front for Victory) was formally part of the Peronist Party but relations between the two
organizations were often strained, as the grouping became effectively an autonomous political
machine controlled by the Kirchners from the Executive.225 Additionally, the highest levels of police
violence since the return of electoral democracy occurred under the Kirchner governments;
moreover, both Néstor and Cristina concentrated power in the executive branch while undercutting
institutional checks and balances and utilized Peronist senators/deputies as a way to block any
effective oversight.226 The lack of a credible opposition or serious electoral competition diminished
executive accountability even further.227 Corruption in Kirchner’s Argentina turned into an
institution in and of itself. Clientelism had always been a tool utilized by the JP to ensure electoral
victories, yet Kircher managed to normalize its usage to the point of expectation. Cristina used
patronage nominations to build up her political grouping and manipulated her powers of
appointment to build up La Cámpora as a personal political machine.228 Political institutions in the
Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo, “Argentina: From Kirchner to Kirchner,” Journal of Democracy, 19(2),
(April 2008). https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2008.0030
225 La Cámpora had once been a loose network of Peronist militants which evolved into a more institutionalized political
grouping, further blurring the distinction between personal and partisan loyalty. Francisco Panizza, “Unpacking
patronage: the politics of patronage appointments in Argentina and Uruguay’s central administrations,” Journal of Politics
in Latin America, (November 2018). ISSN 1868-4890
226 Michelle D. Bonner, “What democratic policing is … and is not,” Policing and Society, 30(9), DOI:
10.1080/10439463.2019.1649405; Luigi Manzetti, “Accountability and Corruption in Argentina during the Kirchner’s
era,” Latin American Research Review, 49(2), (2014). https://www.jstor.org/stable/43670178
227 Steven Levitsky, María Victoria Murillo, “Argentina: From Kirchner to Kirchner,” Journal of Democracy, 19(2), (April
2008). https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2008.0030
228 Francisco Panizza, “Unpacking patronage: the politics of patronage appointments in Argentina and Uruguay’s central
administrations,” Journal of Politics in Latin America, (November 2018). ISSN 1868-4890
224

78
aftermath of the junta had never been given an opportunity to become structurally sound; under
Kirchner, they never would. As explained in Chapter One, clientelism complicates voters’ ability to
truly align to either side of the political spectrum. Clientelism may hinder an individual from
developing consistent political perceptions either by encouraging indifference toward the ideological
left-right spectrum or by increasing uncertainty in the political realm.229
The most recent Kirchner administration showcases how fragile democracy in Argentina has
become. During Cristina’s presidency the state engaged in espionage of political opponents,
economic pressure that targeted various governmental entities and bribery that went
overlooked/ignored by the judiciary due to subservience on their part.230 Additionally, the discursive
populist tool of “us vs them” allowed Kirchner to move beyond the constraints of judiciary control.
The logic of populism transforms politics into an antagonistic confrontation between friends and
enemies politicizing almost all social and political spheres and reducing institutional democratic
spaces to the opposition.231 Instead of being respected institutions, those that go against populist
leaders/narratives—in this case, the judiciary—get arbitrarily labeled as “the enemy.” Cyclical
erosion begins and ends with this manipulation of an empty signifier; one that can be filled by
anyone who might cross the leader. Kirchner’s antagonization of the judicial branch threatened to
undermine the rule of law. This reduction of the importance and legitimacy of the judiciary made it
so that institutions meant to uphold the law become highly malleable and the introduction of these
new norms created a precedent for further abuses in the future. The cycle was bound to begin anew.
Yet, after twelve years of Kirchner governance voters turned to the anti-Peronist bloc led by
Mauricio Macri, Cambiemos (Let’s Change) in the 2015 elections. This change represented a critical
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time for Argentina. Breaking from Peronism opened the doors for a restructuring of the political
theater. Could Argentina undergo such an evolution?
Macri: successful anti-Peronist coalition-building
Mauricio Macri’s coalition-building project can be considered one of Argentina’s most
successful anti-Peronist movements since the Peronist inception. Cambiemos included Macri’s own
party, the center-right Republican Proposal (PRO), as well as the historic Radical Civic Union (UCR)
and a party that grew out of the country’s 2001–02 economic and political crisis, the Civic Coalition
(CC) of Elisa Carrió, who had lost to Cristina Kirchner in 2007.232 This conglomeration of interests
represented Argentinians from across the ideological spectrum but pushed the anti-Peronist front
decisively to the right. The latter “rightist” turn perhaps points to one of the reasons for the
coalition’s successes. For the first time in decades, the Argentinian political theater was decisively
marked along ideological lines of left and right. This center-right was built in times of predominance
of a national-popular center-left, expressed with local particularities by Peronist kirchnerism.233
Moreover, the establishment of a certain political polarization in terms of left and right would mean
an unprecedented legibility of political conflicts and competition in the country, which could provide
cognitive shortcuts to voters to establish expectations regarding the policies defended by each
space.234 Under this specific example, one can defend the utilization of labels of left and right in the
realm of political analysis. In this particular instance categorizations of left and right—as understood
in the traditional academic sense—are telling of a potential evolution in Argentinian politics.
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In 2015, the Peronist and anti-Peronist divide overlapped with the left/right dichotomy
more than ever before. Even though both blocs housed contradictory and competing ideological
elements, the plans and platforms both alliances presented were ideologically bound. This is perhaps
one of the only viable cases wherein labels of left and right paint a fairly accurate picture of the
Argentinian political theater. However, it is critical to note that categories of left and right in Latin
America manifest differently than in the US or other Global North countries. And although in this
particular instance, Argentinian politics were more ideological than in decades past, this “clear-cut”
division did not last long.
Macri’s coalition aligned itself to the middle and upper classes and promoted neoliberal
reform. Cambiemos was set on reversing the damage perpetuated by Kirchner governments; the state
no longer answered to anyone, not even its own branches. Macri portrayed himself as a pragmatist
who could manage bureaucrats and get things done while additionally taking great pains to reassure
voters that they would not lose their welfare benefits or subsidized utilities under his
administration.235 Anti-Peronist rhetoric centered around transparency and the rebuilding of critical
democratic infrastructure. During the campaign, Macri managed to mobilize different sectors of the
Argentinian electorate and in 2015, Cambiemos politically destroyed every single one of Peronism’s
top-tier potential 2019 presidential candidates by defeating them on their home turn, leaving the
Peronist movement leaderless and rudderless.236 Despite this historic victory, Peronism did not stay
down. Ruling as the incumbent with Peronism in opposition is a near-impossible endeavor and the
Macri administration was thus plagued with clashes against JP, an ever-worsening economic crisis,
and an eventual defeat in the 2019 presidential elections.
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Conclusion: what’s next?
Since the 1940s, Argentina has broken away from traditional political conceptualizations and
subverted political calculations/predictions. To call her a country of either the left or right is a gross
understatement of the complexities that makeup her political reality. The left-right dichotomy is a
necessary and useful analytical tool in the realm of politics. However, its lack of precision or nuance
leaves much to be desired in countries wherein populism has been injected into the mainstream
political theater. The LR model can continue to provide scholars with a basic understanding of
politics yet it should not be the end-all-be-all of comparative analyses. The divide is naught but a
skeleton framework; it is our job as academics to expand upon it, to fill the structure with muscle
and blood.
Argentina’s political alliances are not made on the basis of left and right. To know Argentina
is to understand the precarious and fragile nature of political power. To study the nation is to stare
upon a conglomeration of heterogenous and conflicting ideas which somehow manage to meet and
break on a day-by-day basis. Because of this, frameworks that seek to simplify her political reality do
the nation and the academic world a disservice. Labels of left and right merely skim the swirling
surface that is the ocean of political alliances Argentinians constantly navigate. These simple
categorizations obscure the divide that comes first and foremost in any Argentinian political
calculation, that of Peronism and anti-Peronism.
Populism forever changed the political culture of Argentina. With Perón’s rise to power
came the breakdown of Argentina’s ideological spectrum. Investigating Argentina’s Peronist
movement alongside its anti-Peronist challengers point to the numerous ruptures and ideological
“betrayals” both blocs have experienced. The continual evolution of Peronism, under the guise of
different “-isms”—which always lead back to the Perón nucleus (real or imagined)—demonstrates
its lack of ideological strength or commitment. The Peronist base is not ideologically bound but
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rather precariously secured by an allusion to Perón; it is a frame reliant upon the constant division of
society. Peronism can essentially be stripped down to the ways in which the antithetical relationship
between “the people” and “the elite” (two empty, malleable signifiers) is communicated and
performed. “Us vs. them” defines the Argentinian political arena, and these labels can harbor
factions of both the left and right simultaneously.
Expanding upon Ostiguy’s evaluative framework for understanding Argentinian political
identities, this work aimed to highlight the erratic and fluctuating nature of Peronist and antiPeronist coalitions. This lack of ideological saliency proves Aslandis’ and Laclau’s theorization of
populism. The latter is not a thin ideology or a political strategy but a frame. Populist discourse,
through this lens, can be perceived as the systematic dissemination of a frame that diagnoses reality
as problematic because “corrupt elites” have unjustly usurped the sovereign authority of the “noble
people” and maintains that the solution to the problem resides in the righteous political mobilization
of the latter in order to regain power.237 Throughout Argentina’s history leaders have utilized this
political tool to win elections. Peronism has been authoritarian and pro-democracy (though this is
highly debatable); it has swung across the entire left-right spectrum. Oftentimes, the JP is made up
of factions from both the extreme left and right. Although this might seem improbable and
dangerously paradoxical, Peronism has survived its internal fracturing. Peronist leaders have relied
on polarization and antithesis to mobilize their electorate. Since it is not bound by ideological
promises, populism can circumvent the LR divide and any political allegiances it chooses to make.
The same logic can be applied to anti-populist movements. The anti-Peronist coalition has
housed a heterogenous array of interests, leaders, and plans. It has been leftist, rightist and centrist.
Yet, it has always sought to protect democracy. It has positioned itself in stark opposition to

Paris Aslandis, “Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective,” Political Studies, 64 (15), (2016). DOI:
10.1111/1467-9248.12224
237

83
Peronism and has additionally stood as a strong defender of the democratic system. Anti-Peronist is
a frame too, yet one that is confined to its commitment to democracy. Peronism does not make the
same promises.
Perhaps a touch of ideology would save the Argentinian political system. As seen in the 2015
elections, the Peronist/anti-Peronist divide aligned itself well with the left-right divide. In this
specific instance, one could make predictions for the nation along lines demarcated by the LR
dichotomy. This overlap did not hold, and soon enough politics continued to be marked by the
Peronist/anti-Peronist question.
As Peronism continues to split, the Argentinian electorate will have to choose its future. Will
vice-president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner resume her challenging and undermining of both the
rule of law and the president she is meant to serve alongside? Will the anti-Peronists manage to
garner enough support to put up a fight? No matter how strong, destructive and pervasive Peronist
rhetoric may be, the Argentine are a resilient and adaptable people. They have weathered many
storms, they will weather many more.
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Table 1: A delineation of Peronism’s ideological changes (1943-1974)
Peronist wave

1943-1946

Sectors traditionally bound by

Sectors traditionally bound by left-

right-wing ideology or self-

wing ideology or self-proclaimed

proclaimed rightists

leftists

The Army, the Church.

The urban and rural proletariat.239

National industrialists as well as
politically marginal civil and military
right-wing and Social Christian
intellectuals, small and medium
industrial and commercial
entrepreneurs, and the rural middle
bourgeoisie.238
1946-1955

The Army and Church (until around

Urban industrial workers.

1953).
Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista
(ALN)
1955-1974

Vandorista movement, the Rural

Montoneros, Juventud Peronist (JP or

Society, the Argentine Industrial

Peronist Youth), Ejército

Union, Comando de Organización
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(the “Organization Commando), La

Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP or

Guardia de Hierro (the Iron

The People’s Revolutionary Army).241

Guard).240

Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista

Movimiento Nacionalista

(ALN).

Revolucionario Tacuara (MNRT).
La Alianza Anticomunista Argentina
(Triple A).
Table 2: A delineation of anti-Peronism’s ideological changes 1943-1974
Anti-Peronist wave

1943-1946

Sectors traditionally bound by

Sectors traditionally bound by left-

right-wing ideology or self-

wing ideology or self-proclaimed

proclaimed rightists

leftists

Conservative business sectors,

Communists, Socialists, Unión Cívica

conservative Argentine Industrial

Radical (Radical Civic Union), Argentina

Union (Unión Industrial

Libre, Orden Cristiano, Pro-Allied

Argentina).242

forces.243
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1946-1955

Conservatives, La Prensa.244

Communists, Socialists, Unión Cívica
Radical (Radical Civic Union), Argentina
Libre, Orden Cristiano.245
The Church and the Navy (1955).
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